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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation is composed of two essays. The first uses the gravity equation and data 
on bilateral trade to investigate colonial patterns. The second also uses bilateral trade and 
the gravity model. The inquiry in the second essay concerns the causal relation between 
trade and government expenditures. In addition to bilateral trading pattern, data on tariffs 
and trade tax revenues is also examined. 
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 WORLD TRADE AND COLONIAL ORIGINS 
 
Introduction 
Few countries are in need of greater understanding than those once controlled by 
European powers. Former colonies constitute some of the most prosperous and the most 
bereft countries on the planet. The disparity between rich and poor can be attributed to 
any number of variables, but popular perception inevitably drives the discussion toward a 
referendum on colonization. Parent countries are either extolled for establishing 
institutions, property rights and the rule of law or demonized for ravaging local ecologies 
and yoking the population toward their ends. 
But the success of a post-colonial country often has more to do with its ability to 
develop strong trade relations after its independence. Trade, through the mechanism of 
comparative advantage and specialization, can help lift a country from poverty. 
Understanding how former colonies adapt to trade illuminates the wealth disparities that 
are becoming an increasing concern in our modern world. 
Our research shows that newly-independent countries trade more with their sister 
colonies and parent country than with others but that this linkage dissipates over time. It 
takes decades for former colonies to develop trading partners and increase their volume 
of trade to a meaningful level—evolution away from a parent country can be attenuated 
by the nature of the colonization and the disposition of the parent.  
We have laid out a review of the pertinent literature, a theoretical model for 
addressing the quantitative and qualitative nature of colonial trade effects and a 
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description of the data we used in the following pages. We also discuss the results, their 
sensitivity and our conclusions. 
 
Literature Review 
Our research aims to use the gravity model to quantify, qualify and extrapolate the 
influence of colonialism on international trade. 
The gravity equation is one of the most successful and widely used models in 
international trade. Anderson (1979) and Bergstrand (1985) first developed the model 
from physics and found it showed excellent estimation properties for bilateral trade 
volumes. Bilateral trade volumes are related to the distance and to the product of each of 
the trading country’s GDP as Eaton and Kortum (2002) pointed out. 
Various researchers have plumbed the gravity model. They introduced the concept of 
trade barriers, attempting to explain the costs that are implied by crossing international 
borders. Such costs arise from the fact that countries may have different currencies, 
ethno-linguistic characteristics, political institutions, histories, cultures and behavioral 
norms between trading agents. Anderson and Wincoop (2004) describe trade barriers as a 
list of observable variables used in the trade cost function. These variables include 
distance, common language, preferential trade membership, adjacency (common land 
border), and a host of others. Some of these variables, such as distance and adjacency, 
have become mainstays of the gravity model. Other variables, such as whether a country 
is a former colony and whether trading partners speak the same language, were 
introduced recently. 
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Wei (1996) first reported a strong language effect in the gravity equation. Other 
researchers soon corroborated. Eaton and Kortum (2002), Rose and Wincoop (2001) and 
Hummels (2001) each find that countries that speak the same language tend to trade 
more. 
Rose and Wincoop (2001) were among the first who considered the relation between 
colonies in the gravity equation. Estevadeoradal et. al (2003) and Felbermayr and Kohler 
(2006) later confirmed a positive tie between the colonial dummy and trade. 
Rose and Wincoop (2001) examine trade patterns between countries within a larger 
study on currency unions. They include variables that track trade between sister colonies 
and trade between a colony and its parent country. They find that colonies tend to trade 
more between themselves and with their colonial parent. 
Estevadeoradal et. al (2003) investigates the boom of international trade between 
1870 and 1939. They use the gravity equation approach for their study and consider a 
unique colonial dummy to identify if the countries shared a colonial relationship during 
that period. 
Eichengreen and Irwin (1996) investigate trade between 1949 and 1964, considering 
colonial dummies for British colonies, British Commonwealth, US-Philippines and 
Netherlands-Indonesia. Their findings suggest that former British colonies traded 
disproportional more with one another in 1949. They also found that former British 
colonies tended to trade less with one another and less with the rest of the world than 
predicted by the standard gravity model after they added lagged trade data. Trade peaked 
in 1949 for the British Commonwealth but the effect disappeared in the period from 1954 
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to 1964 when the researchers included lagged trade data. The researchers reported larger 
than expected trade flows between the US-Philippines and Netherlands-Indonesia during 
the time considered. 
These investigations into the effect of colonial ties focus on the application of the 
gravity equation model. They represent a small subset of studies in the area of colonial 
development. Early studies of colonial trade, such as Kleiman (1976) did not use the 
gravity model approach. 
Kleiman (1976) investigates the negative effect of bilateralism—a trade bias 
introduced by colonial rule—on the future economic development of African countries. 
The author focuses on the relationship between France and its former colonies, and the 
UK and its former colonies. His main finding is that colonization had a greater effect on 
former French colonies. He postulated that colonial influence on Africa should decrease 
over time and end after a decade of independence (or till the 1970s). 
Literature on colonial effect is not limited to trade considerations. Individual country 
growth and prosperity is also a common topic of inquiry. Most of those studies focus on 
the effect each different parent country has on its former colonies. Lange et al. (2006) 
analyze the economies of former Spanish and British colonies, for example. They claim 
that Spanish colonization had negative consequences. Countries that had been colonized 
by the British did much better after becoming independent. 
Landes (1998) compared French and British colonies. The researcher argued that 
former British colonies have greater prosperity compared to the French colonies due to 
the British propensity to create better cultural and political institutions. He also attributes 
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modern post-colonial poverty to a failed institution building by the European elite during 
the colonial years. 
Bertocchi and Fabio (1996) investigate the impact of European colonization on 
African countries. The authors find that dependencies experience more positive economic 
outcomes than colonies. They find former French and British colonies are better off than 
countries that were once controlled by Belgium, Italy or Portugal. They also discover 
that, on average, growth accelerates after independence. 
We explore the effect of colonialism on international trade during 1962-2000 in this 
research. We follow Rose and Wincoop (2001) and introduce two colonial dummies: 
common colonizer and ex-colony/colonizer. We will quantify the effect of colonialism on 
trade flows, consider the extent to which trade is influenced by the number of years a 
country has been independent and estimate how long the colonial effect may be expected 
to last. 
We will asses the extent trade is influenced by a country’s colonial past. Unlike 
previous studies, we consider four colonial origins (France, Spain, Netherlands and 
United Kingdom). We follow Bertocchi and Fabio (1996) to assess the extent to which 
the number of years a country has been independent impacts its trade by comparing 
colonies that received independence before and after 1945. We pursue Kleiman (1976) to 
estimate when the effects of colonialism may be expected to abate by considering the 
colonial effect on trade from 1962 to 1983 and then from 1984 to 2000. 
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Theoretical Model 
A classical approach for investigating the pattern of international trade is the gravity 
equation. Baier and Bergstrand (2001) give the following definition:” The gravity 
equation is a log-linear cross-sectional specification, relating the nominal bilateral trade 
flow from exporter i to importer j in any year (Xij) to the exporting and importing 
countries’ nominal gross domestic products (Yi and Yj, respectively), distance between 
their economic centers (dij), and typically an array of dummy variables …and a common 
land border”. In simple words gravity equation relates the bilateral trade flows between 
two countries to their GDP and distance. Its well-known formulation is the following: 
 
321
0
ββββ ijjiij dYYX =  (1) 
Where Xij is the volume of bilateral trade between countries i and j, Y is country’s real 
GDP and dij is the distance between them. Variable Yi determines the potential capacity 
of trade of country i, since it reflects its economic capacity. The signs of  β1 and β2 are 
predicted to be positive and β3 negative. The implication of basic gravity theory is that 
trade is a result of attraction and resistance from geographical distance. Geographical 
trade resistance is composed of transportation costs and transport time, and in the basic 
gravity model  dij acts as a proxy variable for the trade resistance. 
The gravity model has been widely used and offers an excellent performance since 
the original work of Tinbergen (1962). The gravity model is often used to estimate the 
effects of trade costs on bilateral trade flows j such as, transport costs, tariffs, border 
effects, language and ethnic effects. 
Thus the gravity equation will look in the following way: 
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 ij
lA
ijjiij
ijij eedYYX εβ βββββ 543210=  (2) 
where Aij is an adjacency (common land border), lij is a dummy for common language 
and e is natural logarithm base and εij is a log-normally distributed error term.  
Neighboring countries (Aij) can be expected to have additional stimulus to trade 
because they have similar tastes and common interests. A common language lij tend to 
increase the trade flows between countries. It provides evidence of common cultural 
roots, shared literature radio and television communications, and even educational 
exchanges, and with all of these come greater knowledge of institutions, networks and 
individuals which makes it likely to forge tighter economic ties (see Helliwell (1997, 
p.10)). So coefficients on β4 and β5 are expected to be positive. 
Using existing literature we formalize our model in a multi-country framework where 
i, j= 1, …., N denotes countries. We base our model on Anderson and Wincoop (2003), 
Lochard and Sousa (2003) and Baier and Bergstrand (2006). Our justification for gravity 
equation rests on Armington model1 assuming that each country is specialized in a 
production of single good. The more substitutable are goods from different countries, the 
higher will be the sensitivity of trade to production costs and geographic barriers. 
We start our model from a standard consumer maximization problem and use 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function.  The choice of this type of 
function was based on theoretical result by Anderson (1979): if elasticity of demand for 
product varieties is constant, then firm scale will not change at all due to tariffs or trade 
                                                 
1
 While we use here the simple Armington assumption, it can be easily extended to a model with 
monopolistic competition. 
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liberalization.  So the utility function of representative consumer in country i is the 
following: 
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where σ elasticity of substitution between products is equal to σ>1, which also equals 
the elasticity of demand η, when number of products is large, and cij is consumption by 
country i consumers of goods from country j . 
The consumers in country i will maximize their utility function subject to total 
expenditures equal to total income so their budget constraint will be : 
 ∑=
j
ijiji pcY  (4) 
where pij is the price that consumers in country i pay for good j and Yi is the GDP of 
country i. Then the solution of constrained utility maximization is:  
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As it is customary in the gravity equation literature, we follow Samuelson (1952) and  
assume “iceberg” transportation costs factor for an imported goods Tij. We assume that 
country i sells its good to country j for the price pij. This price includes all transportation 
costs from country i to j, on c.i.f. (cost, insurance, freight) basis. At the same time pi, 
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local price of good produced in country i is net of any transportation costs, on a f.o.b. 
(free on board) basis. Then ijjij Tpp = ,  notice that if good stays in country then Tjj=1 and 
Tij>1 which means that we need to ship Tij units of product in order for one unit of good 
to reach the final destination. Fraction (Tij-1) of each product “falls into the ocean” while 
being transported from country j to country i.  Taking the “iceberg” costs into 
consideration we can calculate the prices that buyers in country i pay and payments that 
sellers of country j receive2  as 
ij
ij
j T
p
p = . 
Now we can use the equations above to find the import demand function  of country i 
for the good from country j: 
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In equilibrium markets clear and exporter j GDP should be exactly equal to importer i 
expenditures so if we sum over all countries we would receive a balanced trade equation: 
 ∑=
i
ijj XY  (8) 
thus giving us the GDP for country j as a function of GDP of country i : 
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From this we can calculate the equilibrium prices and plug them back into demand 
function (7). Then using this new equation for demand function and assuming symmetric 
                                                 
2
 Maintaining the assumption that all of the “iceberg” costs are paid by the seller. 
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trade costs between countries and after some algebra we will receive the final version of 
the import of country j for good of country i: 
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and 
Y
YS jj =  
where Y  is the world GDP and Sj is the country j share of world expenditures, and 
assuming balanced trade in each country Sj is also country j share of world GDP.  
The last step left is to model the transportation cost Tij. There are going to be three 
components in the cost function. The first three are adjacency (Aij), distance (dij) and 
language (lij) which are included in conventional literature. The fourth element of the cost 
factor is a set of colonial dummies (C). Thus our trade costs factor is: 
 CldAT ijijijij
γρα=  (12) 
where  Aij=exp(α*adji) and adjij =1 when countries i and j share common land border and 
0 otherwise,  dij is the distance between countries i and j, lij=1 if countries i and j speak 
the same language and C
 
represents the vector of dummy variables that we include in the 
trade costs formulation.   
First, we follow Rose and Wincoop (2001) so that our vector C contains two variables 
for colonial control. The two variables capture the effect of bilateralism, or colonial trade 
bias. The first variable, ccij, captures colony-to-colony trade and equals one if countries i 
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and j share a common colonizer and zero otherwise. The second colonial variable, cmij, 
captures the biased trade between colonies and their former masters. This dummy equals 
one if trading countries i and j are former colony and colonizer and zero otherwise. We 
extend Rose and Wincoop (2001) by specifying the colonial origins when considering 
trade between colonies and trade between a colony and its parent country. We consider 
four origins: French, Spanish, Dutch and British. 
Second, we go beyond Rose and Wincoop (2001) to consider trade not just between 
colonies but also the trade between colonies and the rest of the world. To do this, we 
consider two dummies based on whether an exporter or importer is a former colony, c-ei 
and c-ii, where c-ei, is equal one if exporter i is a former colony and zero otherwise and c-
ii is equal one if importer i is a former colony and zero otherwise. Then we denote those 
dummies by their four colonial masters. The first letter of the variable identifies which 
country was the colonial parent. The second letter indicates whether the country is a net 
exporter (e) or importer (i). For example, “f_i=1 if a country is former French colony and 
importer” and “s_e=1 if country is former Spanish colony and exporter” and etc. There 
are eight such dummies, one for each of the four parent countries as an exporter and 
another four for the countries as an importer.  
All the trade barriers described above form a trade cost factor in equation (12). We 
can plug equation (12) back into equation (10) and receive the gravity equation model 
which now includes the colonial effects: 
−+++++= )ln()ln()ln()ln()ln()ln( 543210 ijijijjiij lAdYYX ββββββ  
nji CPP ϕσσ +−−−− )ln()1()ln()1(  (13) 
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where )ln( jP  are price indices and φCn is a vector of colonial dummies described above: 
Colony to colony and colony to colonizer (ccij, cmij,) 
• Colony to colony and colony to colonizer separated into four colonial origins 
(f_ccij ,s_ccij, d_ccij, u_ccij,  f_cmij, s_cmij, d_cmij, u_cmij) 
• Colonial exports and Colonial imports (c-ei, c-ii) 
• Colonial exports and Colonial imports by origins (f_i, s_i, d_i, u_i, f_e, s_e, d_e, 
u_i) 
The gravity equation says the trade flow between two countries are directly 
proportional to the product of the exporting and importing countries nominal GDPs, the 
cost of trade and the price indices for both countries. Anderson and Wincoop (2003) call 
those indices “multilateral resistance” variables. Multilateral resistance variables Pi and 
Pj are not prices, they are not observable, since we do not have statistics on all the prices, 
taxes, trade barriers and other costs in all the countries. These indices depend on bilateral 
resistance {Tij}, including those not directly involving i. Multilateral resistance indices 
are simple summary measures of trade costs for a particular region i with all its trading 
partners (see Anderson and Wincoop (2004, p. 72).  
Earlier gravity model literature such as Anderson (1979) and Bergstrand (1985) 
attempted to omit multilateral resistance variables. McCallum (1995) investigated US-
Canada trade patterns and found that the international border has an enormous negative 
effect on their trade. It became questionable to the literature that this colossal border 
effect maybe due to omitted price terms. After McCallum (1995) there were several 
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attempts to approximate the multilateral resistance variables. Wei (1996) estimated the 
gravity equation using remoteness variables, calculated as the ratio of distances to GDPs.  
But the fundamental contribution to the gravity equation model was done by 
Anderson and Wincoop (2003) who claim that omitting the multilateral resistance 
variables introduces the upward bias on the estimates and that the remoteness variables 
used are atheoretical. The key implication of their study is that the trade is determined by 
relative trade barriers and including multilateral resistance variables is crucial for 
consistent and efficient estimates. Anderson and Wincoop (2003) assume a symmetry of 
costs and estimate the structural equation with nonlinear least squares after solving for 
the multilateral resistance indices as a function of observables trade barriers (distance and 
the international border dummy).  
The nonlinear least square estimation of the gravity model imposes a problem, since it 
is not as easy to perform as OLS. Both Anderson and Wincoop (2003) and Feenstra 
(2004) note that fixed effect approach which includes a single set of region specific 
dummies will be identical nonlinear estimation. However as pointed out by Baier and 
Bergstrand (2006) fixed-effects dummy variables can account for multilateral resistance 
variables but without the structural system of equations one still can not generate region- 
or pair-specific comparative statics. Baier and Bergstrand (2006) suggest a solution for 
the complicated nonlinear estimation problem, called BV-OLS. They perform the first-
order log-linear Taylor series expansion of the price indices equation and find equations 
that identify the exogenous factors determining the multilateral price terms in gravity 
model. Thus, 
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where Zij is any of the variables from the trade costs factor specified in the equation (12) 
and MWRZij is the estimated multilateral resistance variable for the trade cost variable Zij. 
Each equation contains two terms. The first one is a GDP weighted (geometric) average 
of the gross trade costs facing country across all regions. The second term is the influence 
of the world resistance and thus is identical to all countries. Those equations are used as 
the proxies for the multilateral resistance variables, which not only make it possible to 
estimate the gravity model with OLS but also allow us to find the comparative statics and 
thus the source of multilateral resistance. It is important to notice that inclusion of 
approximated multilateral resistance variables requires estimation of the constrained OLS 
model, where the coefficient estimates of the variables are forced to have an opposite 
sign with the corresponding estimates of the multilateral resistance variables. In order to 
run the constrained regression we need to constrain the coefficients on GDPs to their 
theoretically implied value, therefore we construct:  
 
)ln()ln()ln(_ jiij YYXsharetrade −−=  
Then equation (13) is modified to account for the constraints and to include the 
multilateral resistance variables proxies: 
 
 0 1 2 3_ ln( ) ln( ) ln( )ij ij ijtrade share d A l C MWRZ=β +β +β +β +ϕ +θ  (14) 
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where as before  dij is distance between countries i and j, Aij is an adjacency, lij is a 
dummy for common language,  φC is a vector of colonial dummies (ccij, cmij, f_cci, 
s_ccij, d_ccij, u_ccij,  f_cmij, s_cmij, d_cmij, u_cmij, c-ei, c-ii,  f_i, s_i, d_i, u_i, f_e, s_e, 
d_e, u_i) and MWRZ is a vector of proxies for all multilateral resistance variables 
included in the regression. 
Equation (14) is the model that we are going to use to find answers for our research 
questions. First, how much does colonialism influences countries trade flows? Second, 
does it matter when the colonies received the independence? And third, how long does 
the colonial effect last? That formulation of gravity equation will enable us to estimate 
the presence of bilateralism, the colonial trade bias, when former colonies trade more 
between themselves and with former colonizer rather then with other countries in the 
world. It will also allow us to estimate the impact of different colonial origins on bilateral 
trade flows and see whether the colonial influence vanishes with the time. 
We use the vector of colonial relationship specified by Rose and Wincoop (2001) and 
expand it by colonial origins to identify the presence of bilateralism. Also we will use 
another specification to identify the effect of colonial origins on bilateral trade. Both 
models are based on equation (14), the difference between the two is the specification of 
the colonial vector. For the first case we include only colony to colony trade and colony 
to master trade general and by origins, while for the second specification we include 
colonial export and colonial import for all colonies and by their origins.  
Both models will be applied to a different set of settings. First, we consider pooled 
sample of former colonies, no matter when they received independence. Second, we 
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divide a set of colonies into those that received their independence before 1945 and after 
1945. And finally third, we investigate those colonies that received independence after 
1945, by dividing the dataset into two parts time spans, a decade after the colonization 
has ended (1962-1983) and time after that (1984-2000). Our choice of time period is 
mainly based on Kleiman (1976) who claimed that the colonial effect should last for a 
decade after the independence. According to Kleiman (1976) until the end of 1970s, we 
expand the time span until 1983, instead of 1980, the reason for that is a change in the 
trade dataset, which happened in 1984, that excluded small observations of trade from the 
sample.3 
If bilateralism is present then estimated coefficients on the dummies ccij, cmij, f_ccij 
,s_ccij, d_ccij, u_ccij, f_cmij, s_cmij, d_cmij, u_cmij, would have a positive sign. The 
coefficients on the dummies c-ei, c-ii would show an influence of colonial origins on trade 
and coefficients f_i, s_i, d_i, u_i, f_e, s_e, d_e, u_e would show that influence by origin. 
Those coefficients can have either negative or positive signs. Negative coefficient would 
mean that country i  has a disadvantage in trade due to the fact it was a colony of X 
(where X is France, Spain, Netherlands and UK) while positive coefficient on those 
dummies would claim that being a colony of X (where X is France, Spain, Netherlands 
and UK) has a positive impact on country i trade. This part of our study will 
support/decline the numerous investigations in current literature that are trying to find the 
“best” colonizer, for instance, whether Britain was better than France or vice versa. 
 
 
                                                 
3
 See details in Data Description section of this paper. 
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Data Description 
The data for this project come from four sources: National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Center for International 
Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania and the Department of Economics at 
Macalester College. 
Our primary data on bilateral trade flow come from the NBER. Robert Feenstra and 
Robert Lipsey constructed this unique data set from United Nations under a grant from 
the National Science Foundation to the NBER.4 Feenstra and Lipsey (2004) revised some 
of the UN country codes to aggregate small countries and adjust for countries that no 
longer exist. The researchers combined Belgium and Luxemburg into a single coded-
entity for example. They also recoded some countries that were former Soviet Republics 
but no longer exist. 
Both importers and exporters report the data. Importers report CIF (cost, insurance, 
freight) and exporters report FOB (free on board). Import data are usually more reliable 
than export data since they constitute a tax base, as pointed by Felbermayr and Kohler 
(2006). Constructing data from importers alone gives more accurate reporting and reflects 
a larger number of country pairs with positive trade. Feenstra and Lipsey (2004) also give 
primacy to the importers’ reports whenever they are available, but use exporter data when 
they are not available. 
The number of trade observation is charted for each year between 1962 and 2000 in 
Appendix C. The graph shows an obvious difference in the number of trade observations 
                                                 
4
 This dataset covers the years 1962-2000 and is available at: http://www.nber.org/data/. 
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made before 1984 and after that year. The difference comes from a change in the way the 
United Nations recorded its data. Before 1984, it included all the trade data, no matter 
how small. But starting in 1984, the UN only recorded data that exceeded USD$100,000 
for each bilateral flow. Feenstra and Lipsey (2004) revised the data by adding smaller-
valued trade to the UN dataset, but only for certain countries.  
There are 203 countries and or territories listed in the dataset but there are only 72 
countries listed during 1984-2000. Those 72 countries accounted for 98% of the world’s 
exports in the last five years. We present the list of all the countries in the database in 
Appendix A and the list of post-1984 countries in Appendix B. The World Trade Flows 
dataset includes data on country i’s imports from country j, Xi,j t, where t stands for the 
year. The data are reported in nominal thousands of US dollars and each observation is 
unique, reported only once in the database. A majority of the countries are included in the 
database, despite the UN data collection change. The UN still tracked each trade one of 
the 72-listed countries did with one of the un-listed countries. The only data that is lost is 
from one unlisted country trading with another unlisted country. We transform the trade 
data into real terms with the base year =2000. 
GDP data come from the Center for International Comparisons at the University of 
Pennsylvania and are called the “Penn World Tables.” They provide data on GDP per 
capita and population for 188 countries for some, or all, of the years 1950-2004. We use 
the real GDP per capita in constant prices (Chain) with the base year=2000 and multiply 
that by population to receive the country i GDP in millions of US dollars. 
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We use the CIA Factbook5 to obtain data on distance, adjacency (common land 
border) and colonial history. The CIA Factbook has information on 266 countries, 
territories and uninhabited islands. We use several tables from CIA Factbook: the 
geographic coordinates table to calculate distance, the land boundaries table to create 
adjacency dummy and the independence table to create colonial dummies. The table with 
geographic coordinates includes rounded latitude and longitude figures and based on the 
Gazetteer of Conventional Names, Third Edition, August 1988, US Board on Geographic 
Names and other sources.  
We obtain data on latitude and longitude for country i and calculate its distance from 
country j using spherical geometry and trigonometric math functions. The near-spherical 
shape of the earth dictates the following formula for approximating the distance between 
countries: 
Distance=3962.6*acos(sin(latrad_i)*sin(latrad_j)+cos(latrad_i)*cos(latrad_j)*cos(longra
d_i-longrad_j)) 
The table with land boundaries contains the total length of all land boundaries and the 
individual lengths for each of the contiguous border countries. We, however, do not use 
the total length of all boundaries. We only obtain data for country i, and then create a 
dummy variable which is equal to one if country i has a common land border with 
country j and zero otherwise.  
The independence table gives the date that each country achieved sovereignty from its 
nation, empire, or trusteeship and links the former colonial country to its parent. This 
                                                 
5
 https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html 
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posed the toughest obstacles of the data collection. Some of the countries have different 
colonial masters in different periods of time or had several colonizers simultaneously. 
The Dominican Republic, for example, received independence from Haiti while Haiti 
itself was colonized by France, according to the CIA Factbook. Somalia is also difficult 
to categorize since it was merged from two colonizers: the UK and Italy. We consider 
four colonial masters in our study and create a colonial dummy variable for each: France, 
Spain, UK and the Netherlands. The list of colonies by colonizers with the independence 
date is present in Table 1.8. 
The data on languages are from Western Hemispheric Research Resources at the 
Department of Economics at Macalester College.6 The dataset lists 176 countries and 
separates them by the origin of their language into 15 different groups (Arabic, Burmese, 
Chinese, Dutch, English, French, German, Greek, Korean, Malay, Persian, Portuguese, 
Spanish, Swedish and Other).  
We changed the language dataset from its original version by recoding the data and 
expanding it to include more countries. The original dataset divided countries into 15 
language categories. The first 14 groups each described a different set of related 
languages. The 15th group, which was coded as “99,” included all the countries that speak 
languages that do not easily fall into one of the first 14 categories. The language spoken 
in a country coded “99” was not spoken anywhere else in the world. 
The original dataset did not include countries that emerged in the early 1990s after the 
break up of the former Soviet Union empire. 
                                                 
6
 http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/PAGE/HAVEMAN/Trade.Resources/Data/Gravity/language.txt 
 
 21 
We revised the dataset in two major ways:  
1. We split the “99” code language designation into separate languages. We gave 
each of the 35 countries that fell into this catch-all its own code. We change 
languages codes of those countries to their own unique code ranging from 101 
to 135. Having the same language code for countries that have different 
languages was inappropriate for our research. 
2. We added countries formed at the beginning of the 1990s that had been missing 
from the original dataset. These countries were the product of the break up of 
the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Countries formed from 
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia retained their languages. The Slovakian and 
Czech languages are very similar. The Serbian, Yugoslavian, Croatian, Bosnia 
and Herzegovinan and Macedonian languages all belong to South Slavic 
language group. 
We omit trade observations on former Soviet satellite countries. The data were 
inconsistent and limited only to years after 1991. We kept observations of the Soviet 
Union between 1962 and 1990 which were consistent with the quality of the rest of our 
data. After all the changes described above, we had 50 different language codes. A value 
of one is assigned as a language variable for any bilateral trade flow between two 
countries sharing a common language. 
The summary statistics for all of the variables described above are represented in 
Appendix E. 
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Results 
We use constrained ordinary least squares to estimate our model of interest with trade 
share as the endogenous variable for the period 1962-2000. We estimate the model using 
proxies for multilateral resistance variables. We also include a year-fixed effect because 
the number of trade observations is different before 1984 than after. The results of the 
regressions are given in Table 1.1 and Table 1.4. In these tables, we report only variables 
of interest and do not report the estimates of the year effect, though every regression from 
those tables included year dummies in the estimation. The coefficients on the year effects 
are very similar for all the regressions, so we report them separately in Table 1.7.  
We find a positive impact of common land border and common language on trade for 
all of the regressions. This is consistent with theoretical expectations and previous 
studies. The exponent on distance in those regressions is negative with an absolute value 
between 1.11 and 1.21. It is higher than the value predicted by the actual gravity model 
used to account for the physical attraction between two bodies, but it is consistent with 
the estimates reported by other researchers. 
Further discussion of results is divided into two sections: one is concerned with 
findings of the bilateralism and the other is dedicated to the colonial effect on export and 
import. 
 
Presence of Bilateralism 
The results of our investigation for the presence of bilateralism may be found in Table 
1.1. Regressions 1 and 2 use all the trade data for years between 1962 and 2000 and 
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include as colonies all the countries that were colonized in the past. Both regression 1 and 
2 are pooled regressions, they consider a country a colony if it was ever colonized, even 
if it received independence two hundred years ago, as was the case for many Spanish 
colonies, such as Argentina (1811) and Mexico (1810). For the list of colonies by origin 
as well as by year of independence see Table 1.8. 
In regression 1, we confirm finding by Rose and Wincoop (2001) and report a 
positive coefficient on common colonizer equal to 0.26 and a coefficient on ex-
colony/colonizer 1.44. Our coefficients are of a smaller magnitude than those found by 
Rose and Wincoop (2001) who reported the former equal to 0.68 and the later equal to 
1.74. The difference between the estimates may be due to the fact that Rose and Wincoop 
(2001) used the trade data for years 1970 to 1995, while we use a wider time span 
including years from 1962 to 2000. Thus we capture the earlier years of a country’s 
history, when the colonial relationship may have had a greater effect. 
Regression 2 includes a different set of colonial dummies. Dummies from regression 
1 are now specified by colonial origin so that we can investigate the effect of different 
origins on a colony’s trade with its colonial sisters and its parent. All four origin 
coefficients on trade between colonies and their parent are positive. But coefficients on 
trade between colonies and their sisters are positive for French, Dutch, and British 
colonies and are negative for Spanish colonies. All except one Spanish of the colonies 
received independence before 1945.7 So in regressions 3 through 6 we break out the 
pooled sample of colonies into those that received independence before 1945 and after 
                                                 
7
 it is Equatorial Guinea that received independence in 1968 
 24 
1945. Regressions 3 and 4 consider colonies as only those countries that received 
independence before 1945, while regressions 5 and 6 include colonies that received 
independence after 1945.  
Regressions 3 and 5 compare the presence of colonial bias for the different sets of 
colonies. The estimated coefficient on trade between former colony and colonizer is 
positive in both regressions, it is 0.73 for countries that received their independence 
before 1945, and is half of the estimated coefficient for those colonies that received 
independence after 1945 (the coefficient value for those colonies is 1.44). Both 
coefficients are significant at a 1% level of significance. The coefficients on trade 
between former colonies are even more dramatically different for the two sets of 
colonies. Those that receive independence after 1945 had a positive coefficient of 0.40, 
while those that received independence before 1945 had a negative coefficient of 0.23. 
This implies that the bilateral trade flows between former colonies of the pre-1945 group 
are smaller than those with other countries. This leads us to say that earlier independence 
causes countries to trade less with their colonial masters and trade even less with other 
colonies. 
Regressions 3 and 5 look at the aggregate level without specifying colonial origins, so 
we can not tell which origin is driving the results. So we consider regressions 4 and 6. 
One is for colonies with independence before 1945 and the other is for those that received 
it after 1945. Both regressions consider the effect of colonial origins on bilateralism, so 
they are simply a more detailed version of regressions 3 and 5. All the Dutch colonies 
received independence after 1945, so they are only included in regression 6 but not in 
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regression 4. The results of those regressions reveal the decrease in colony to colony 
trade in the pre-1945 group was chiefly set by the Spanish subset of colonies, which had 
a negative 0.37 coefficient on trade between colonies. The decrease in the colonies’ trade 
with their parents in that group was driven more by British colonies and less by the 
Spanish. 
Dividing the set of colonies into those that gained independence before and after 1945 
allowed us to say there is some evidence of bilateralism which declines after 
independence was received. This leads us to conclude that the colonial impact is 
declining. We consider only the set of post 1945 countries next. These countries still may 
have the residuals of the colonial effect on their trade. We run regression for those 
countries only, but we count for two time periods, 1962-1983 and 1984-2000. The 
decision on how to divide the trade was based on the structure of our trade dataset and 
Kleiman (1976) who said that the colonial effect on trade should remain a factor for a 
decade after a country gains independence.8 If Kleiman’s (1976) hypothesis was correct, 
then the colonial effect should vanish after a decade of independence, or by the end of 
1970s for most countries. 
Regression 7 and 10 present the findings for the two time periods. Regressions 7 and 
9 show that a colony’s trade with its sisters almost falls by half. It is 0.45 for the 1962-
1983 time period and only 0.25 for the years between 1984 and 2000. The trade between 
a colony and its parent is also declining, with coefficients of 1.76 and 1.23 respectively. 
                                                 
8
 The trade dataset has different sources for data before 1984 and after. Data before 1983 contain more 
country pairs and record smaller values of trade that after 1984. We conduct sensitivity tests of the dataset 
composition in the next section. 
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Regressions 8 and 10 show that the decline in a colony’s trade with its sister is largely 
driven by the French group, while a decline in trade with its parent is represented by all 
colonial groups. This leads us to conclude that the effect of colonial past is decreasing 
with the time, but it has not vanished, as was suggested by Kleiman (1976). The colonial 
effect may take decades to disappear. 
 
Colonial Effects on Export and Import  
We continue our investigation by exploring the influence of colonialism on a 
country’s total trade. We do not limit our concern to the country’s specific trading 
partners. Before, we were only interested in a colony’s trade with its sisters and with its 
colonial parent. Now we consider a colony’s trade with all the countries in the world. The 
results of this research are presented in Table 1.4. 
In regression 1 the estimates on dummies for colonial exporter and colonial importer 
are negative 2.05 and negative 1.50, respectively, both significant at 1% level of 
significance. Regression 2 breaks our estimates into four colonial origins – French, 
Spanish, Dutch and British. This detailed specification allows us to explore the effect of 
different colonial masters on the trade flows of the colonies. Regression 2 suggests that 
the negative coefficient on colonial exporter is caused by French and British exporters, 
and the negative coefficient on colonial importer seems to be driven by all the colonies 
except Dutch.9 
                                                 
9
 We found high sensitivity of Spanish colonial exporter coefficient, depending on other variables included 
in regression 2. 
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Breaking the pooled data into colonies that gained independence before 1945 and 
those that gained their independence after 1945 is instructive. It shows that those with 
earlier independence have switched signs of their coefficients on colonial exporter and 
colonial importer, which are 2.80 and 2.74 respectively. Those results are exactly 
opposite for the group that gained independence after 1945. There, the same estimates are 
found to be negative 2.82 and negative 3.38. The dramatic negative impact in the post-
1945 group is primarily caused by the French and British. Remarkably, the coefficients 
on Dutch colonies both for exporter and importer are positive despite the fact that all of 
them belong to the post-1945 independence subset of colonies.  
We consider the subset of colonies that received independence after 1945 next. 
Regressions 7 through 10 represent the subset of those colonies, inspected for two time 
periods: 1962-1983 and 1984-2000. There is evidence of decreased colonial influence on 
countries’ trade. The estimated coefficient on colonial exporter is negative 4.10 during 
1962-1983 and is negative 1.67 during 1984-2000. The estimates on colonial importer for 
the same time periods are negative 4.39 and negative 2.44 respectively. Regressions 9 
and 10 show that the increase in those coefficients is driven by all the colonial origins––
French, Spanish, Dutch and British. All coefficients both for exporter and importer have 
increased during that time. It is worth pointing out that all the coefficients in Table 1.4, 
regression 1 through 10, are highly significant at 1% level of significance. 
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Sensitivity Analysis 
For the regressions reported in Table 1.1, we present the sensitivity analysis in Tables 
1.2 and Table 1.3. The sensitivity analysis for the regression in Table 1.4 is shown in 
Table 1.5 and Table 1.6. In all the sensitivity-analysis tables, we keep the regressions 
numbered in exactly the same way as they were numbered in the original tables. 
Regressions in Table 1.2 and Table 1.3 are listed under the same numbers as they are in 
Table 1.1. Regressions in Table 1.5 and Table 1.6 are listed under the same number as 
they are in Table 1.4. 
Tables 1.2 and 1.5 address the truncation problem we have with the trade data. Before 
1984, the dataset included all the trade data for all countries. But starting in 1984, the UN 
only recorded data that exceeded USD$100,000 for 72 countries.10 Tables 1.2 and 1.5 
repeat many of the regressions from Table 1.1 and Table 1.4 and include a restricted 
version of those regressions next to them. The restricted regressions use the time period 
1962-1983 and only those pairs of trade countries that are present in post 1984 period. 
The limited regressions have the same column number as the original, but a letter “a” is 
added to their column label. For example, regression 1 is the original regression and 
regression 1a is the regression which used a limited sample of countries. 
We do not find any significant change in our results after limiting the data in this 
way. All the regressions in Table 1.2 are remarkably unaffected. Coefficients on common 
colonizer have decreased a little, but most of the coefficients hardly change.  
                                                 
10
 See detailed explanation in Data Description section 
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Results in Table 1.5 are more sensitive to the limitation of the sample. The two worth 
noticing are the coefficient on the British colonial exporter, which becomes insignificant 
in the 1962-1983 time period under the limited sample, and the coefficient on Spanish 
colonial importer, which changes sign in regression 1.4.  
Table 1.3 and 1.6 make changes to the list of British colonies. Both Canada and the 
US received independence before 1900 and both are among the world’s largest 
economies. In our original regressions, we considered the US and Canada as former 
colonies of the UK. Now we remove them from the list of colonies. Table 1.3 and Table 
1.6 present results where the US and Canada are counted as if they where never 
colonized. Table 1.3 shows that most of the estimates found in Table 1.1 remain identical. 
There are a few that have changed. The first is the coefficient on the British-colony trade 
with sisters (regression 4a) that became insignificant in pre-1945 group (the coefficient in 
column 4 is 0.16 compared to the coefficient in column 4a which is 0.02). There is also a 
minor change in the coefficients on the common colonizer and ex-colony trade with the 
parent in regression 3a, both of which decreased relative to their counterparts in column 
3.  
Table 1.6 had more changes compared to the original estimates in Table 1.4, but none 
of them changed our interpretation of the results. The only thing that we witness is a big 
decrease on the British colony as exporter and British colony as importer in the pre-1945 
group.  
Thus the results presented in Tables 1.1 and 1.4 do not appear to be overly sensitive 
to data construction issues.  Neither the change in the sampling methods used by the 
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United Nations nor the colonial definition that we adopted has substantial overall impacts 
on the estimated coefficients. 
 
Conclusion 
Our research aimed to quantify, qualify and extrapolate the influence of colonialism 
on international trade. 
The literature suggests that former colonies trade more with each other and with 
their colonial master than with non-related countries. Rose and Wincoop (2001) find a 
presence of bilateralism and we confirm their findings. Our dataset, however, included 
observations over a greater time period than previous studies and added information 
about the parent country of each colony. Taking a wider swath of time under 
consideration diluted the importance of colonial ties on trade. It became evident that 
further qualification of the data was necessary to better understand these trade relations. 
Cutting the post-colonial countries into two groups based on when they received 
independence helped clarify the residual influence of colonialism on trade. We found that 
the earlier a country received independence, the less it traded with its colonial sisters and 
its colonial parent. This effect was particularly noticeable for Spanish and British 
colonies, many of which received independence before 1945. The results were not 
conclusive for Dutch and French colonies, which typically split from their parent 
countries after 1945. 
Independent countries evolve new economic relations and trade ties over time. 
Kleiman (1976) predicted that colonial trade ties last at least a decade after a country 
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gains its independence and we corroborate that. We studied the trade patterns of countries 
that became independent after 1945 and found statistically significant trade linkages to 
their sister colonies and parent country declined over time but persisted through the 
1990s. We observed the decline in trade dependence with the parent country for each 
colony we considered, but French colonies drove the decline in trading between sister 
countries and with the parent.  
We also investigated the influence of a colonial past on a country’s exports and 
imports to the rest of the world. We find results similar to those from our inquiry into 
bilateralism: countries that received independence before 1945 trade with the rest of the 
world more than colonies that received their independence after 1945. This evidence 
holds for the French, Spanish and British. The Dutch colonies, which all received 
independence after 1945, don’t act like the other colonies considered. They trade more 
with the rest of the world than their colonial counterparts. Still, we see the colonial 
influence decreasing over time for all the countries considered. 
Further research in this area might include a consideration of the types of goods 
traded. Colonies tend to shape their entire national product based on the needs of their 
parent country. This can lead to a myopic lack of agricultural or industrial diversification. 
The international demand and price of certain commodities and finished goods, and the 
unique demands of parent countries fluctuate over time, causing bumps in the trade data. 
Colonies with a history of specialization can be hit particularly hard. Some correction or 
consideration for the nature of the national exports and imports might help clarify 
colonial trade relations. 
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Table 1.1 Bilateralism           
  
      
 After 1945 by periods After 1945 by periods 
  All colonies  BEFORE 1945  AFTER 1945 1962-1983 1984-2000 1962-1983 1984-2000 
Model  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
        
 
  
  
 
 
  
  
Log distance  -1.19 -1.20 -1.18 -1.19 -1.18 -1.18 -1.19 -1.17 -1.19 -1.17 
  (-185.23) (-184.81) (-182.74) (-182.56) (-184.99) (-185.15) (-125.23) (-145.55) (-125.27) (-145.63) 
Adjacency  0.56 0.50 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.50 0.60 0.46 0.54 0.44 
  (19.49) (17.57) (19.04) (18.90) (18.99) (17.39) (14.20) (12.51) (12.78) (12.02) 
Common-language 0.41 0.46 0.69 0.71 0.54 0.52 0.65 0.37 0.61 0.36 
  (24.93) (27.82) (44.99) (45.47) (36.99) (35.38) (30.34) (19.36) (28.41) (19.27) 
Common colonizer 0.26   -0.23  0.40   0.45 0.25     
  (15.76)   (-7.73)  (18.99)   (15.38) (8.35)     
Ex-colony/colonizer 1.44   0.73  1.49   1.76 1.23     
  (43.38)   (13.51)  (39.13)   (29.60) (27.01)     
French colony-colony  1.26  n/a   1.27   1.43 0.74 
   (31.54)     (31.69)   (26.79) (11.65) 
Spanish colony-
colony  -0.21  -0.37   n/a   n/a n/a 
   (-5.92)  (-10.49)           
Dutch colony-colony  0.44*  n/a   0.41*   -0.02* 1.03 
   (1.97)     (1.82)   (-0.05) (3.49) 
UK colony-colony  0.15  0.16   0.06   0.03* 0.10 
   (7.34)  (2.66)   (2.26)   (0.72) (2.84) 
French colony master  1.64  0.14*   1.66   2.05 1.25 
   (26.92)  (0.49)   (26.84)   (21.41) (16.86) 
Spanish colony 
master  1.01  0.72   2.72   3.63 1.96 
   (15.33)  (10.81)   (9.67)   (7.91) (6.13) 
Dutch colony master  1.71  n/a   1.67   1.62 1.77 
   (11.02)     (10.72)   (6.53) (9.76) 
UK colony master  1.44  0.74   1.34   1.55 1.13 
   (29.78)  (7.99)   (26.24)   (19.47) (18.57) 
            
            
Root MSE  2.158 2.122 2.164 2.164 2.159 2.157 2.432 1.778 2.429 1.778 
# of observations 303,442 303,442 303,442 303,442 303,442 303,442 164,766 138,676 164,766 138,676 
Notes: Dependent variable: trade share, t-statistics in parentheses. All the coefficients, except *, are significant at 1% level. Table does not include estimated coefficient on year 
effect though they are included in all regressions.  
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Table 1.2 Sensitivity of Bilateralism with limited sample 
     After 1945 by periods  After 1945 by periods 
  All colonies 1962-1983 1962-1983 1962-1983 1962-1983 
Model   (1) (1a) (2) (2a) (7) (7a) (9) (9a) 
   
 
  
  
      
Log distance  -1.19 -1.19 -1.20 -1.21 -1.19 -1.20 -1.19 -1.20 
  (-185.23) (-178.41) (-184.81) (-178.11) (-125.23) (-113.09) (-125.27) (-113.06) 
Adjacency  0.56 0.41 0.50 0.37 0.60 0.33 0.54 0.28 
  (19.49) (12.99) (17.57) (11.76) (14.20) (6.39) (12.78) (5.37) 
Common-language 0.41 0.34 0.46 0.43 0.65 0.58 0.61 0.58 
  (24.93) (19.52) (27.82) (24.28) (30.34) (24.05) (28.41) (23.89) 
Common colonizer 0.26 0.18     0.45 0.35     
  (15.76) (10.34)     (15.38) (9.26)     
Ex-colony/colonizer 1.44 1.48     1.76 1.80     
  (43.38) (45.62)     (29.60) (30.86)     
French colony-colony   1.26 1.17   1.43 1.61 
    (31.54) (23.65)   (26.79) (21.28) 
Spanish colony-colony   -0.21 -0.33   n/a n/a 
    (-5.92) (-9.16)       
Dutch colony-colony   0.44* 0.27*   -0.02* -0.48* 
    (1.97) (1.13)   (-0.05) (-1.30) 
UK colony-colony   0.15 0.15   0.03* -0.07* 
    (7.34) (6.97)   (0.72) (-1.68) 
French colony master   1.64 1.67   2.05 2.09 
    (26.92) (27.69)   (21.41) (22.18) 
Spanish colony master   1.01 1.02   3.63 3.69 
    (15.33) (15.80)   (7.91) (8.13) 
Dutch colony master   1.71 1.78   1.62 1.71 
    (11.02) (11.75)   (6.53) (7.06) 
UK colony master   1.44 1.46   1.55 1.56 
    (29.78) (30.98)   (19.47) (19.99) 
      
  
  
          
Root MSE  2.158 2.095 2.122 2.093 2.432 2.371 2.429 2.367 
# of observations 303,442 277,838 303,442 277,838 164,766 139,162 164,766 139,162 
Notes: Dependent variable: trade share, t-statistics in parentheses. All the coefficients, except *, are significant at 1% level. Table does not include estimated coefficient on year 
effect though they are included in all regressions. (a) regressions use limited sample of trade pairs for 1962-1983. 
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Table 1.3 Bilateralism without US and Canada 
   All colonies BEFORE 1945 
          
Model  (1) (1a) (2) (2a) (3) (3a) (4) (4a) 
     
         
Log distance  -1.19 -1.18 -1.20 -1.20 -1.18 -1.18 -1.19 -1.19 
  (-185.23) (-184.21) (-184.81) (-184.61) (-182.74) (-182.73) (-182.56) (-182.56) 
Adjacency  0.56 0.56 0.50 0.50 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 
  (19.49) (19.51) (17.57) (17.54) (19.04) (18.92) (18.90) (18.91) 
Common-language 0.41 0.43 0.46 0.48 0.69 0.70 0.71 0.71 
  (24.93) (27.40) (27.82) (29.69) (44.99) (45.58) (45.47) (45.86) 
Common colonizer 0.26 0.26   -0.23 -0.31    
  (15.76) (15.91)   (-7.73) (-9.64)    
Ex-colony/colonizer 1.44 1.44   0.73 0.82    
  (43.38) (43.64)   (13.51) (14.59)    
French colony-colony  
 
1.26 1.26    n/a n/a 
   
 
(31.54) (31.50)       
Spanish colony-colony  
 
-0.21 -0.22   
 
-0.37 -0.37 
   
 
(-5.92) (-6.21)   
 
(-10.49) (-10.58) 
Dutch colony-colony  
 
0.44* 0.44*   
 
n/a n/a 
   
 
(1.97) (1.96)   
 
   
UK colony-colony  
 
0.15 0.14   
 
0.16 0.02* 
   
 
(7.34) (6.66)   
 
(2.66) (0.23) 
French colony master  
 
1.64 1.63   
 
0.14* 0.14* 
   
 
(26.92) (26.80)   
 
(0.49) (0.48) 
Spanish colony master  
 
1.01 0.99   
 
0.72 0.72 
   
 
(15.33) (15.12)   
 
(10.81) (10.77) 
Dutch colony master  
 
1.71 1.70   
 
n/a n/a 
   
 
(11.02) (10.95)   
 
   
UK colony master  
 
1.44 1.49   
 
0.74 1.13 
   
 
(29.78) (30.52)   
 
(7.99) (10.53) 
      
  
  
  
        
Root MSE  2.158 2.158 2.122 2.155 2.164 2.164 2.164 2.164 
# of observations 303,442 303,442 303,442 303,442 303,442 303,442 303,442 303,442 
Notes: Dependent variable:  trade share, t-statistics in parentheses. All the coefficients, except *, are significant at 1% level. Table does not 
include estimated coefficient on year effect though they are included in all regressions.  (a) regressions do not include US and Canada as 
former colonies. 
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Table 1.4 Colonial effects on export and import 
    
      
After 1945 by periods After 1945 by periods 
  All colonies BEFORE 1945 AFTER 1945 1962-1983 1984-2000 1962-1983 1984-2000 
Model   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
   
       
  
      
Log distance  -1.11 -1.13 -1.21 -1.19 -1.11 -1.13 -1.12 -1.10 -1.14 -1.11 
  (-171.04) (-175.64) (-188.78) (-186.95) (-175.4) (-178.53) (-119.63) (-137.63) (-121.53) (-139.66) 
Adjacency  0.63 0.60 0.48 0.49 0.63 0.60 0.73 0.49 0.70 0.47 
  (21.98) (21.20) (16.65) (17.28) (21.98) (21.06) (17.66) (13.38) (16.89) (12.86) 
Common-language 0.76 0.78 0.67 0.69 0.79 0.78 0.93 0.57 0.92 0.57 
  (53.57) (55.28) (47.4) (49.18) (56.06) (55.59) (45.65) (31.15) (45.22) (31.10) 
Colony exporter  -2.05  2.80   -2.82  -4.10 -1.67     
  (-44.99)  (33.56)   (-61.29)  (-52.28) (-32.54)     
Colony importer  -1.50  2.74   -3.38  -4.39 -2.44     
  (-31.31)  (34.90)   (-76.30)  (-55.74) (-50.65)     
French colony exporter  -4.25 
  
n/a 
 
-3.86 
    
-4.78 -2.60 
  
 
(-50.77) 
  
  
 
(-42.49) 
    
(-39.31) (-17.25) 
Spanish colony exporter 
 
0.71 
  
2.86 
 
n/a 
    
n/a n/a 
  
 
(8.09) 
  
(32.94) 
 
 
    
    
Dutch colony exporter 
 
7.44 
  
n/a 
 
8.31 
    
4.95 11.90 
  
 
(16.43) 
  
  
 
(18.70) 
    
(7.30) (21.64) 
UK colony exporter 
 
-1.98 
  
6.44 
 
-1.99 
    
-3.28 -1.29 
  
 
(-22.36) 
  
(33.83) 
 
(-24.03) 
    
(-25.69) (-11.04) 
French colony importer 
 
-4.12 
  
n/a 
 
-3.16 
    
-3.89 -2.40 
  
 
(-50.69) 
  
  
 
(-37.09) 
    
(-33.91) (-16.04) 
Spanish colony importer 
 
-0.62 
  
2.29 
 
n/a 
    
n/a n/a 
  
 
(-6.99) 
  
(27.40) 
 
 
    
    
Dutch colony importer 
 
12.10 
  
n/a 
 
12.64 
    
9.16 15.44 
  
 
(27.14) 
  
  
 
(29.43) 
    
(13.87) (29.58) 
UK colony importer 
 
-3.57 
  
7.13 
 
-3.87 
    
-4.91 -3.12 
  
 
(-45.02) 
  
(40.47) 
 
(-52.74) 
    
(-42.24) (-29.48) 
    
  
  
  
  
            
Root MSE  2.158 2.136 2.156 2.148 2.141 2.135 2.406 1.767 2.402 1.757 
# of observations 303,442 303,442 303,442 303,442 303,442 303,442 164,766 138,676 164,766 138,676 
Notes: Dependent variable:  trade share, t-statistics in parentheses. All the coefficients are significant at 1% level. Table does not include estimated coefficient on year effect 
though they are included in all regressions.  
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Table 1..5 Sensitivity of Colonial effects on export and import with limited sample 
     After 1945 by periods  After 1945 by periods 
  All colonies 1962-1983 1962-1983 1962-1983 1962-1983 
Model  (1) (1a) (2) (2a) (7) (7a) (9) (9a) 
      
  
 
 
        
Log distance  -1.11 -1.10 -1.13 -1.11 -1.12 -1.07 -1.14 -1.09 
  (-171.04) (-161.07) (-175.64) (-164.54) (-119.63) (-100.08) (-121.53) (-102.11) 
Adjacency  0.63 0.46 0.60 0.42 0.73 0.43 0.70 0.41 
  (21.98) (14.65) (21.20) (13.59) (17.66) (8.41) (16.89) (8.07) 
Common-language 0.76 0.71 0.78 0.73 0.93 0.90 0.92 0.90 
  (53.57) (46.97) (55.28) (48.81) (45.65) (338.41) (45.22) (38.57) 
Colony exporter -2.05 -1.32   -4.10 -2.99     
  (-44.99) (-30.95)   (-52.28) (-45.60)     
Colony importer -1.50 -1.80   -4.39 -3.16     
  (-31.31) (-46.06)   (-55.74) (-53.01)     
French colony exporter 
   
-4.25 -5.16     -4.78 -6.92 
  
   
(-50.77) (-55.53) 
    
(-39.31) (-42.62) 
Spanish colony exporter 
   
0.71 1.04     n/a n/a 
  
   
(8.09) (11.14) 
    
    
Dutch colony exporter 
   
7.44 7.18     4.95 5.59 
  
   
(16.43) (15.97) 
    
(7.30) (7.76) 
UK colony exporter 
   
-1.98 -0.46     -3.28 -0.14* 
  
   
(-22.36) (-4.69) 
    
(-25.69) (-0.96) 
French colony importer 
   
-4.12 -4.57     -3.89 -4.40 
  
   
(-50.69) (-49.14) 
    
(-33.91) (-27.36) 
Spanish colony importer 
   
-0.62 0.84     n/a n/a 
  
   
(-6.99) (9.10) 
    
    
Dutch colony importer 
   
12.10 14.01     9.16 15.94 
  
   
(27.14) (31.51) 
    
(13.87) (21.87) 
UK colony importer 
   
-3.57 -2.80     -4.91 -3.18 
    
   
(-45.02) (-31.28) 
    
(-42.24) (-22.78) 
    
    
  
          
Root MSE  2.158 2.095 2.136 2.070 2.406 2.352 2.402 2.338 
# of observations 303,442 277,838 303,442 277,838 164,766 139,162 164,766 139,162 
Notes: Dependent variable: trade share, t-statistics in parentheses. All the coefficients, except *, are significant at 1% level. Table does not include estimated coefficient on year 
effect though they are included in all regressions.  (a) regressions use aggregated trade for 1962-1983. 
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Table 1.6 Colonial effects on export and import without US and Canada 
   All colonies BEFORE 1945 
         
Model  (1) (1a) (2) (2a) (3) (3a) (4) (4a) 
     
           
Log distance  -1.11 -1.11 -1.13 -1.13 -1.21 -1.20 -1.19 -1.20 
  (-171.04) (-171.47) (-175.64) (-176.46) (-188.78) (-187.41) (-186.95) (-187.28) 
Adjacency  0.63 0.63 0.60 0.60 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.49 
  (21.98) (21.97) (21.20) (20.98) (16.65) (16.89) (17.28) (16.95) 
Common-language 0.76 0.76 0.78 0.78 0.67 0.67 0.69 0.67 
  (53.57) (53.80) (55.28) (55.23) (47.4) (47.02) (49.18) (47.23) 
Colony exporter  -2.05 -1.42   2.80 2.54    
  (-44.99) (-33.40)   (33.56) (31.56)    
Colony importer  -1.50 -1.92   2.74 1.84    
  (-31.31) (-47.35)   (34.90) (24.20)    
French colony exporter   -4.25 -4.08    n/a n/a 
    (-50.77) (-46.76)       
Spanish colony exporter   0.71 0.85    2.86 2.71 
    (8.09) (9.61)    (32.94) (31.93) 
Dutch colony exporter   7.44 7.42    n/a n/a 
    (16.43) (16.36)       
UK colony exporter   -1.98 -1.72    6.44 3.64 
    (-22.36) (-22.01)    (33.83) (13.32) 
French colony importer   -4.12 -3.61    n/a n/a 
    (-50.69) (-43.21)       
Spanish colony importer   -0.62 -0.29    2.29 1.84 
    (-6.99) (-3.34)    (27.40) (22.50) 
Dutch colony importer   12.10 12.39    n/a n/a 
    (27.14) (27.74)       
UK colony importer   -3.57 -3.25    7.13 3.37 
    (-45.02) (-46.45)    (40.47) (13.02) 
      
  
  
  
        
Root MSE  2.158 2.157 2.136 2.135 2.156 2.159 2.148 2.156 
# of observations   303,442 303,442 303,442 303,442 303,442 303,442 303,442 303,442 
Notes: Dependent variable:  trade share, t-statistics in parentheses. All the coefficients, except *, are significant at 1% level. Table does not 
include estimated coefficient on year effect though they are included in all regressions.  (a) regressions do not include US and Canada as former 
colonies. 
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Table 1.7 Year effects 
               
Year  Coefficient   Year  Coefficient   Year  Coefficient 
     
   
1963 -0.08*  1976 -0.57  1989 -0.46 
 
(-1.85) 
  
(-14.60)  
 
(-11.10) 
1964 -0.10*  1977 -0.51  1990 -0.54 
 
(-2.16) 
  
(-13.05)  
 
(-13.18) 
1965 -0.23  1978 -0.30  1991 -1.26 
 
(-5.28) 
 
 (-7.39)  
 
(-31.20) 
1966 -0.34  1979 -0.62  1992 -1.49 
 
(-7.80) 
  
(-15.89)  
 
(-37.22) 
1967 -0.42  1980 -0.49  1993 -1.67 
 
(-9.60)  
 
(-12.64)  
 
(-42.03) 
1968 -0.55  1981 -0.70  1994 -1.72 
 
(-12.59)  
 
(-17.86)  
 
(-43.35) 
1969 -0.67  1982 -0.79  1995 -1.68 
 
(-15.65)  
 
(-19.69)  
 
(-42.59) 
1970 -0.52  1983 -0.60  1996 -1.74 
 
(-13.13)  
 
(-14.55)  
 
(-44.28) 
1971 -0.63  1984 0.00*  1997 -1.82 
 
(-16.05)  
 
(-0.07)  
 
(-46.45) 
1972 -0.65  1985 -0.14  1998 -1.94 
 
(-16.47)  
 
(-3.24)  
 
(-49.47) 
1973 -0.56  1986 -0.24  1999 -2.00 
 
(-14.30)  
 
(-5.80)  
 
(-51.20) 
1974 -0.40  1987 -0.28  2000 -2.03 
 
(-10.17)  
 
(-6.77)  
 
(-51.73) 
1975 -0.48  1988 -0.42    
 
(-12.34)  
 
(-10.23)  
  
Root MSE 2.158   
   
# of observations 303,442     
      
Notes: Dependent variable: logarithm of trade share, t-statistics in parentheses. All the coefficients, 
except *, are significant at 1% level. Dummy for year 1962 is omitted. Year effects here are from 
regression 1 in Table 1. Year effects from other regressions are almost identical. 
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Table 1.8. Colonial Origins and year of independence (where applicable)  
Colonies of UK   Colonies of France   Colonies of Spain   
Colonies of 
Netherlands   
 Year  Year  Year  Year  Year 
Afghanistan  1919 Malawi  1964 Algeria  1962 Argentina  1816 Aruba  n/a 
Anguilla  n/a Malaysia  1957 Benin  1960 Bolivia  1825 Indonesia  1945 
Antigua and Barbuda  1981 Maldives  1965 Burkina Faso  1960 Chile  1810 
Netherlands 
Antilles  n/a 
Australia  1901 Malta  1964 Cambodia  1953 Colombia  1810 Suriname  1975 
Bahamas, The  1973 Mauritius  1968 
Central African 
Republic 1960 Costa Rica  1821    
Bahrain  1971 Montserrat  n/a Chad  1960 Cuba  1902    
Barbados  1966 Nauru  1968 Comoros  1975 Ecuador  1822    
Belize  1981 New Zealand  1907 Congo, Republic of  1960 El Salvador  1821    
Bermuda  n/a Nigeria  1960 Cote d'Ivoire  1960 
Equatorial 
Guinea  1968    
Botswana  1966 Pakistan  1947 Djibouti  1977 Guatemala  1821    
British Virgin Islands  n/a Pitcairn Islands  n/a French Guiana  n/a Honduras  1821    
Brunei  1984 Qatar  1971 French Polynesia  n/a Mexico  1810    
Burma  1948 Saint Helena  n/a Gabon  1960 Nicaragua  1821    
Canada  1867 Saint Kitts and Nevis  1983 Guadeloupe  n/a Panama  1903    
Cayman Islands  n/a Saint Lucia  1979 Guinea  1958 Paraguay  1811    
Cyprus  1960 St Vincent and Grenadines  1979 Haiti  1804 Peru  1821    
Dominica  1978 Seychelles  1976 Laos  1949 Philippines  1898    
Egypt  1922 Sierra Leone  1961 Madagascar  1960 Venezuela  1811    
Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas)  n/a Solomon Islands  1978 Mali  1960       
Fiji  1970 Somalia  1960 Martinique  n/a       
Gambia, The  1965 South Africa  1910 Mauritania  1960       
Ghana  1957 Sri Lanka  1948 Mayotte  n/a       
Gibraltar  n/a Sudan  1956 Morocco  1956       
Grenada  1974 Swaziland  1968 New Caledonia  n/a       
Guernsey  n/a Tanzania  1964 Niger  1960       
Guyana  1966 Tonga  1970 Reunion  n/a       
India  1947 Trinidad and Tobago  1962 
Saint Pierre and 
Miquelon  n/a       
Iraq  1932 Turks and Caicos Islands  n/a Senegal  1960       
Israel  1948 Tuvalu  1978 Tunisia  1956       
Jamaica  1962 Uganda  1962 Vanuatu  1980       
Jersey  n/a United Arab Emirates  1971 Vietnam  1945       
Jordan  1946 United States  1776 Wallis and Futuna  n/a       
Kenya  1963 Vanuatu  1980          
Kiribati  1979 Zambia  1964          
Kuwait  1961 Zimbabwe  1980          
Lesotho  1966             
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Appendix A. List of countries and territories in NBER-UN World Trade Flows Dataset 
Afghanistan  Dem.Rp.Congo  Italy  Qatar 
Afr.Other NS  Denmark  Jamaica  Rep Moldova 
Africa N.NES  Djibouti  Japan  Romania 
Albania  Dominican Rp  Jordan  Russian Fed 
Algeria  E Europe NES  Kazakhstan  Rwanda 
Angola  EEC NES  Kenya  Samoa 
Areas NES  Ecuador  Kiribati  Saudi Arabia 
Argentina  Egypt  Korea D P Rp  Senegal 
Armenia  El Salvador  Korea Rep.  Seychelles 
Asia NES  Eq.Guinea  Kuwait  Sierra Leone 
Asia West NS  Estonia  Kyrgyzstan  Singapore 
Australia  Ethiopia  LAIA NES  Slovakia 
Austria  Eur. EFTA NS  Lao P.Dem.R  Slovenia 
Azerbaijan  Eur.Other NE  Latvia  Somalia 
Bahamas  Falkland Is  Lebanon  South Africa 
Bahrain  Fiji  Liberia  Spain 
Bangladesh  Finland  Libya  Sri Lanka 
Barbados  Fm German DR  Lithuania  St.Helena 
Belarus  Fm German FR  Madagascar  St.Kt-Nev-An 
Belgium-Lux  Fm USSR  Malawi  St.Pierre Mq 
Belize  Fm Yemen Ar  Malaysia  Sudan 
Benin  Fm Yemen AR  Mali  Suriname 
Bermuda  Fm Yemen Dm  Malta  Sweden 
Bolivia  Fm Yugoslav  Mauritania  Switz.Liecht 
Bosnia Herzg  Fr Ind O  Mauritius  Syria 
Br.Antr.Terr  Fr.Guiana  Mexico  Taiwan 
Brazil  France,Monac  Mongolia  Tajikistan 
Bulgaria  Gabon  Morocco  Tanzania 
Burkina Faso  Gambia  Mozambique  TFYR Macedna 
Burundi  Georgia  Myanmar  Thailand 
CACM NES  Germany  Nepal  Togo 
Cambodia  Ghana  Neth.Ant.Aru  Trinidad Tbg 
Cameroon  Gibraltar  Netherlands  Tunisia 
Canada  Greece  Neutral Zone  Turkey 
Carib. NES  Greenland  New Calednia  Turkmenistan 
Cent.Afr.Rep  Guadeloupe  New Zealand  Uganda 
Chad  Guatemala  Nicaragua  UK 
Chile  Guinea  Niger  Ukraine 
China  GuineaBissau  Nigeria  Untd Arab Em 
China HK SAR  Guyana  Norway  Uruguay 
China MC SAR  Haiti  Occ.Pal.Terr  US NES 
China SC  Honduras  Oman  USA 
Colombia  Hungary  Oth.Oceania  Uzbekistan 
Congo  Iceland  Pakistan  Venezuela 
Costa Rica  India  Panama  Viet Nam 
Cote Divoire  Indonesia  Papua N.Guin  World 
Croatia  Int Org  Paraguay  Yemen 
Cuba  Iran  Peru  Yugoslavia 
Cyprus  Iraq  Philippines  Zambia 
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Appendix B. List of 72 countries that account for 98% of world trade for the last 5 
years11 
    
Algeria   Kuwait  
Angola   Libya   
Argentina    Luxemburg  
Australia      Malaysia  
Austria    Mexico  
Belgium      Morocco  
Belgium-Luxembourg  Netherlands  
Brazil     New Zealand  
Bulgaria   Nigeria  
Canada    Norway  
Chile     Oman  
China     Pakistan  
Colombia     Peru  
Czech Republic      Philippines  
Denmark     Poland  
Dominican Republic     Portugal  
Ecuador      Qatar  
Finland      Romania  
Fm Czechoslovakia  Russian Federation  
Fm Fed Germany  Saudi Arabia  
Fm USSR  Singapore  
Fm Yugoslavia  Slovakia  
France   Slovenia  
Germany  South Afr. Cus. Union  
Greece    South Africa  
Hong Kong  Spain  
Hungary  Sweden  
India  Switzerland  
Indonesia  Thailand  
Iran  Tunisia  
Ireland  Turkey  
Israel  United Arab Emirates  
Italy  United Kingdom  
Japan  USA  
Kazakhstan  Venezuela  
Korea Republic  Vietnam  
                                                 
11
 This table is taken from Feenstra et.al (2004). Belgium and Luxemburg are listed here as separated 
countries, but in the bilateral trade dataset they are pooled together. 
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Appendix C. Number of trade observations 1962-2000 
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Appendix D. Mean of trade 1962-2000 
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Appendix E. Summary Statistics   
             
Variable 
  
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
     
  
Economic variables       
     
  
Year 
 
303442 1982 11 1962 2000 
Trade 
 
303442 3093 26127 0.01 232699 
Log trade 
 
303442 4 3 -5 15 
GDP exporter 
 
303442 325 858 0 9850 
GDP importer 
 
303442 307 856 0 9850 
Log GDP exporter 
 
303442 17.82 1.98 12.32 23.01 
Log GDP importer 
 
303442 18.01 1.90 12.32 23.01 
 
 
     
Geographic variables       
 
 
     
Population exporter 
 
303442 49096 144450 53 1262474 
Population importer 
 
303442 42670 130460 53 1262474 
Distance 
 
303442 4658 2728 49 12382 
Log distance 
 
303442 8 1 4 9 
 
 
     
Common dummy variables      
 
 
     
Adjacency 
 
303442 0.02 0.15 0 1 
Common language 
 
303442 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Common colonizer 
 
303442 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Ex-colony/colonizer 
 
303442 0.02 0.13 0 1 
Importer colony 
 
303442 0.54 0.50 0 1 
Exporter colony 
 
303442 0.52 0.50 0 1 
 
 
     
Colonial origin variables      
 
 
     
French colony with sister 
 
303442 0.01 0.12 0 1 
Spanish colony with sister 303442 0.02 0.15 0 1 
Dutch colony with sister 
 
303442 0.00 0.02 0 1 
UK colony with sister 
 
303442 0.09 0.28 0 1 
French colony with parent 
 
303442 0.01 0.07 0 1 
Spanish colony with parent 303442 0.00 0.07 0 1 
Dutch colony with parent 
 
303442 0.00 0.03 0 1 
UK colony with parent 
 
303442 0.01 0.10 0 1 
 
 
     
French colony importer 
 
303442 0.11 0.32 0 1 
Spanish colony importer 
 
303442 0.13 0.33 0 1 
Dutch colony importer 
 
303442 0.01 0.10 0 1 
UK colony importer 
 
303442 0.25 0.42 0 1 
French colony exporter 
 
303442 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Spanish colony exporter 
 
303442 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Dutch colony exporter 
 
303442 0.01 0.09 0 1 
UK colony exporter 
 
303442 0.25 0.42 0 1 
 
      
Notes: Trade is in millions of US dollars, GDP is in billions of US dollars, Population in thousands. 
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TRADE AND GOVERNMENT: THE CAUSALITY CASE 
 
Introduction 
There is evidence of the relationship between the size of government and the size of 
international trade the cause of which may be of particular interest to both policy makers 
and trade experts. Prior work by Rodrik (1996) argues that expansion of trade causes 
government to grow in order to provide social insurance against the external economic 
fluctuation. 
However, as even Rodrik points out, the causality could go the other way. For many 
reasons the size of government and the size of trade in an economy could be positively 
related and, indeed, growth in the size of government could precede expansion of trade.   
We propose to examine the causal relation between trade and government size in 
several ways. First we replicate Rodrik’s analysis using an extended dataset. We also 
collect data on tariff rates and on trade tax revenues and explore the time series patterns 
in these. In addition, we use disaggregated data on trade by examining bilateral trading 
patterns across country pairs. These disaggregated data are exploited in two ways. One 
uses an augmented form of the classic gravity equation by including government 
spending as a gravity factor like income. The other uses bilateral trading patterns to 
define trade volatility as an attempt at a direct test of Rodrik’s social insurance 
hypothesis, that is, does trade volatility create income volatility, and does government 
then step in. 
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Literature Review 
A large body of economic literature concerns the economic determinants of 
government size, the determinants of international trade and the relationship linking these 
two variables. 
One of the most influential papers in the theory of government and trade is famous 
paper by Rodrik (1996). He explores the relationship between increase in government 
and increase in trade. He finds a positive correlation between economy’s exposure to 
foreign trade and size of its government. Rodrik believes that the explanation for this 
relationship is that government expenditures are used to provide social insurance against 
external risk. He also finds the share of trade in GDP in early 1960’s is a statistically 
significant predictor of the expansion of the government consumption over the 
subsequent three decades. The author assumes that the causality should run from 
exposure to external risk to government spending.  
Recent studies of the economics of government and trade, by Adsera and Boix 
(2002), Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) and Alesina et al. (2004) offer different hypothesis 
to explain the link between government size and trade openness.  
Adsera and Boix (2002) perform the study of the correlation between country’s 
openness to trade and size of government. They attempt to include politics as a possible 
explanation for this relationship.  Alesina et al. (2004) explore another aspect of the 
development in international trade. They claim size of countries is crucial for 
understanding of increase in international trade. They review the impact of market size on 
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growth and endogenous determinant of country size. They show that size of countries 
influence country’s preferences for international trade. 
Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) argue that the size of government correlates negatively 
with country size and positively with trade openness. They show that smaller countries 
have a larger share of public consumption in GDP, and are also more open to trade. They 
claim that these empirical observations may account for the observed positive empirical 
relationship between trade openness and government size. Their research is done in two 
steps. The authors first show that government consumption, as a share of GDP, is smaller 
in larger countries. In the next step they confirm the observation that small countries tend 
to be more open to international trade. They claim that these two facts, taken together, 
may account for the observation that open countries have larger governments. They 
suggest a different link between trade openness and government size than suggested by 
Rodrik (1996). Their research implies a different but not mutually exclusive explanation 
for the positive empirical relationship between openness and government size. 
Specifically, they argue that positive link between the two is mediated by country size. In 
this way they put some doubts on the direct link between openness and the share of 
government consumption. At the same time they find evidence of a direct relationship 
between openness to trade and the size of government transfers, which is in the spirit of 
Rodrik (1996). 
Our research is also aimed to explore the link between size of government and 
international trade. Our research investigates the issue of reverse causality which 
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concerned Rodrik (1996) as well. We consider the body of literature which points toward 
a negative relationship between international trade and taxes.   
Kenny and Winer (2006) perform the study on the structure of taxation. They suggest 
that no government would choose a point on the backward bending part of any rate-
revenue Laffer curve, since it would lead to a marginal cost that is higher than those 
implied by the lower tax rate that raises the same revenue. They also claim that since the 
total marginal costs associated with any level of total revenue decline as tax base 
expands, the equilibrium size of government increases. They show an importance of trade 
as a tax base and find that countries with large international trade sector rely more on 
taxes on exports and imports. The claim is that share of trade to GDP has a highly 
significant positive impact on the share of revenue that comes from trade taxes. Although 
they say that the effect of the expansion of trade on the trade tax is not straightforward. 
They believe that with the large potential trade tax base, the same trade revenue can be 
raised with a lower tax rate or with more extensive loopholes. But the larger tax base 
makes trade taxation more attractive. Despite the theoretical uncertainty on the direction 
of the two effects their empirical findings suggest that the trade base has a negative but 
insignificant effect on the trade tax rate. They also find that countries in which 
international trade is important rely more on trade taxes.  
Fisher (2006)  raises the question about anxiety of developing countries that lowering 
trade tariffs will reduce government revenues.  He demonstrates that dependence on tariff 
revenue is diminishing and trade liberalization need not result in lower total tax revenues 
or even lower customs revenues. Moreover he claims that much depends on a country's 
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current tariff and trade regime, its tax structure and that at some point, a country needs to 
broaden its tax base.  
Recent IMF report1 on links between trade liberalization and tax revenue states that:  
“As is now widely recognized, trade liberalization does not necessarily reduce 
revenue from trade taxes. This is most likely to be the case when liberalization 
involves…cutting tariffs that are initially set, for protective reasons, at such high levels 
that a reduction will cause trade volumes to increase by more than enough to offset the 
direct revenue loss from lower rates. … (Lower tax rate) leads to an expansion of trade 
and trade tax revenue will increase”. 
This research is based on the hypothesis that points toward a relationship between 
size of government and the degree of international trade. Our research takes as a starting 
point a paper by Rodrik (1996) who argues that open countries are more subject to 
external shocks, and therefore need a larger public sector to provide a stabilizing role. 
However, we consider a reverse causality than claimed by Rodrik (1996) we suggest that 
the relationship runs the other way, i.e. it is increase in government that leads to the 
increase in trade. Our reasoning is based on Kenny and Winer (2006).  We claim that 
government needs additional recourses as it grows and in order to provide those recourses 
it lowers the taxes on international trade. The later pulls the trigger and leads to an 
increase in the international trade. 
 
                                                 
1
 Dealing with the Revenue Consequences of Trade Reform(Background Paper for Review of Fund 
Work on Trade)  
IMF February 15, 2005 
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Theoretical Model 
As noted in the introduction, we will test the Rodrik hypothesis several different 
ways. The main idea is to examine the causal relation between trade and government size 
in a time series context. Does the growth of government follow or precede the expansion 
of trade. 
The conventional approach is to explore the relationship between the share of 
government expenditures in GDP to “openness,” or the share of trade (measured as 
exports plus imports) in GDP. We undertake this analysis as well using an expanded 
dataset of international trade.  
In addition, we apply the classic trade theory gravity equation augmented in a way to 
further investigation of this relationship. In the past, the gravity equation has been used to 
make conclusions about trade between countries by looking at their relative distances and 
GDPs. We add government expenditures of trading pairs to the classic model. Just as the 
size of an economy acts as a force on trade, we postulate that government expenditure 
exerts a similar force. Tweaking the classic gravity equation in this way allows us to 
evaluate the empirical robustness of the theory employed by Rodrik. 
The classic gravity equation is a cross-sectional specification relating the nominal 
bilateral trade flow from exporter i to importer j in any year (Xij) to the exporting and 
importing countries’ nominal gross domestic products (Yi and Yj, respectively).  
 ij i j ijX Y Y Z
α β=  (1) 
where Zij stands for all of the additional elements usually included in the gravity model, 
such as, distance, adjacency, language, and colonial effects. 
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In this paper we augment the gravity equation by including the size of government 
expenditures in the model. We use a standard structure of gravity equation and add 
government size (as measured by government expenditures) as a component to the 
equation in the same way other researches have included adjacency, language and 
colonialism to the gravity equation. The basic idea of the gravity model is that trade 
between two countries responds to the weight of their combined incomes. We postulate a 
similar force will exist in response to the weight of their government sizes. 
Inclusion of the government expenditures is not substantively different than inclusion 
of colony, language, adjacency or other variables. We include the total government 
expenditures, not the shares of expenditures to GDP in keeping with the classic 
formulation of the gravity equation, which uses absolute GDP rather than a normalized 
variable. Including the total government expenditures of both exporter and importer is 
baked into our assumption that it is the combined size of expenditures that drives the 
trade effect. 
We also employ the disaggregated data on trade by using observations on pairs of 
countries. This comes from the simple gravity equation trade model. Trade between a 
pair of countries is driven by many factors. By combining and using the data in this way 
follows the gravity equation methodology—a methodology which has proven its 
usefulness for empirically evaluating other aspects of trade.2 So our new gravity model 
can be written as: 
                                                 
2
 The possible counter-argument against using the trade observations on the pairs of countries may be that 
since government size is the same for the same country’s trade observations it may deflate the standard 
errors. While this may be true, it is essentially the same as including other dummies in the model, and the 
literature has not raised/addressed that question. 
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 ij i j ij i jX Y Y Z G G
α β λ µ=   (2) 
Our interest is in exploring the causal relation between trade and government 
spending. We do this using a Granger-style time series analysis in which we look at the 
first difference of the logs, and time shifts of these variables going in both directions. Our 
motivation is to see how changes in government spending are correlated to changes in 
trade. 
Our study is concerned with the presence of causality between government size and 
the size of international trade and we define two models to estimate this causation. The 
first model deals with the possibility that government expands first, and that this is 
followed by the expansion of trade. If so, there should be a time lag between the increase 
in government and increase in trade.  
To simplify the notation, let’s express the difference in the logs of trade through time 
as: 
 1ln lnijt ijt ijtX X X −= −&  (3) 
and use similar notation for the other variables. Our gravity equation now becomes: 
 ijt it jt it jtX A Y Y G G= +α +β + λ +µ& && & &  (4) 
First differencing the log form of the gravity model eliminates all the variables included 
in ijZ , i.e., distance, adjacency, language and colony, since those variables do not vary 
with time. 
The Granger causality approach includes leads and lags of the right-hand side 
variable on the hypothesis that if government is causing trade but not the reverse, future 
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values of the change government spending should be correlated with current values of 
trade. If the increase in government size causes increase in trade, we will have positive 
coefficients on the lagged values of government spending. If the opposite holds true, the 
coefficients will be negative.  
We flip equation (4) to look for causation going in the other direction and to test the 
idea that increases in trade lead to expansion in the size of a country’s government: 
Rodrik’s theory. In this flip test we must make an assumption about the values of λ and 
µ. For simplicity, we assume that they are both the same. Thus, we have  
 
1( )i j ij i j ijG G X Y Y Z−α −β − Γ=  (5) 
Then let: 
 1 1ln( ) ln( )ijt it jt it jtg G G G G− −= −&  (6) 
so that we capture this inverse gravity effect in terms of percentage changes. Again we 
include leads and lags of the right-hand side variables. If an increase in trade causes an 
increase in government, we will have positive coefficients on the lagged RHS values of 
trade. 
In the event that we find that the causality runs opposite to the way that Rodrik 
asserts, it is interesting to consider what might be going on. It might be possible that 
government is financing increased government spending by increased trade tax revenues. 
So we collect data on these and examine the time series patterns with government 
spending. Also, we collect data on tariff rates and rank countries as high, middle, and 
low. We then examine the sensitivity of the relations between trade and government size 
for these groups.  
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There are some factors not accounted for in this empirical analysis. Tariffs and non-
tariff barriers reduce trade. Because of this, trade volume may be a measure of how 
“open” a country is, regardless of country’s specific tariff rates.  An alternative way of 
investigating a country’s “openness” to trade is to observe country’s level of trade in the 
years after a country joins the GATT or other tariff and non-tariff barrier reducing body.3 
We look at the entry to the GATT as a point of reference of countries willingness to 
accept trade. We explore the growth rate of a country’s trade and government 
expenditures before and after the country joins the GATT.  We consider the simplest 
possible specification and regress the average yearly growth of country’s trade N years 
after entering the GATT on the average yearly growth of this country N years before 
entering the GATT. Figure 2.1 below shows graphically the intervals of time that we 
choose for the analysis, with N=1, 3, 5, 8 and 10 years before and after entering the 
GATT. 
                                                 
3
 The reason why chose the GATT is that until 1995 (the  year when WTO was created) it was the world’s 
major agreement on reduced tariff barriers. We consider GATT and not WTO because our data set is 
covering the years 1962-2000,  and the GATT was signed in 1948 and continued until the end of 1994. 
WTO was signed in 1995 and continues until today. So we chose GATT because it covers more of the 
period of time that we have the data available for. 
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Figure 2.1. The GATT Entrance Time Span. 
-10 -5-8 -3 0-1 31 1085
 
Note: The 0 in the center of the scale represents the year a country enters the GATT. 
 
Data Description  
The trade data for this project come from four sources: National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER), Center for International Comparisons at the University of 
Pennsylvania, UNCTAD - TRAINS (Trade Analysis and Information System) and 
WTO4. Robert Feenstra and Robert Lipsey constructed this unique data set from United 
Nations under a grant from the National Science Foundation to the NBER.5 Feenstra and 
Lipsey (2004) revised some of the UN country codes to aggregate small countries and 
adjust for countries that no longer exist. The researchers combined Belgium and 
Luxemburg into a single coded-entity for example. They also recoded some countries that 
were former Soviet Republics but no longer exist. 
Both importers and exporters report the data. Importers report CIF (cost, insurance, 
freight) and exporters report FOB (free on board). Import data are usually more reliable 
                                                 
4
 Data on the GATT membership and the year of entrance to the GATT is available at : 
http://www.wto.org/ 
5 This dataset covers the years 1962-2000 and is available at: http://www.nber.org/data/. 
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than export data since they constitute a tax base, as pointed by Felbermayr and Kohler 
(2006). Constructing data from importers alone gives more accurate reporting and reflects 
a larger number of country pairs with positive trade. Feenstra and Lipsey (2004) also give 
primacy to the importers’ reports whenever they are available, but use exporter data when 
they are not available. 
The number of trade observations changes in the middle of the dataset as UN changed 
the way that data were collected. Before 1984, it included all the trade data, no matter 
how small. But starting in 1984, the UN only recorded data that exceeded USD$100,000 
for each bilateral flow. Feenstra and Lipsey (2004) revised the data by adding smaller-
valued trade to the UN dataset, but only for certain countries. There are 203 countries and 
or territories listed in the dataset for the period 1962-1983 but there are only 72 countries 
listed during 1984-2000. Those 72 countries accounted for 98% of the world’s exports in 
the last five years. We confine our analysis largely to the period 1984-2000 because of 
the issues of the dataset composition over the entire period. 
The World Trade Flows dataset includes data on country i’s imports from country j, 
Xi,j t, where t stands for the year. The data are reported in nominal thousands of US dollars 
and each observation is unique, reported only once in the database. We transform the 
trade data into real terms with the base year =2000. 
GDP and Government expenditures data come from the Center for International 
Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania and are called the “Penn World Tables.” 
They provide data on GDP per capita and population for 188 countries for some, or all, of 
the years 1950-2004. We use the real GDP per capita in constant prices (Chain) with the 
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base year=2000 and multiply that by population to receive the country i GDP in millions 
of US dollars. Penn World Tables offer data on Government Share of GDP. In order to 
generate Government expenditures we multiply the Government Share on GDP. 
Government expenditures are in constant prices in millions of US dollars. 
The data on tariffs come from the UNCTAD - TRAINS6 database which ranges from 
1988-2000. The dataset includes most favored nation rates and effectively applied rates 
for 120 countries. For the earlier years 1988-1992 the data are available for the very few 
countries. More data are available in the later years. For our research we use the most 
favored nation rates. The mean tariff rate is 14 percent with the standard deviation equal 
to 10 percent. We calculate the average of the tariff rates over the period 1993-2000 and 
divide the sample into high, low and medium tariff rates countries. We use half a 
standard deviation from the mean as the rule to divide the countries into different groups. 
Thus the low tariff group consists of 46 countries that have tariffs less than 9 percent. The 
high tariff rates group has 26 countries with the tariffs higher than 19 percent.  And the 
rest of the 48 countries fall into medium tariff rate group with the tariff rates ranging 
between 9 and 19 percent.  
The summary statistics for all of the variables described above are represented in 
Table 2.1. 
 
                                                 
6
 Dataset is available at http://r0.unctad.org/trains_new/index.shtm  
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Table 2.1 Summary Statistics   
           
Variable 
  
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
    
  
Bilateral trade variables    
 
   
  
Year 
 1992 3 1988 1996 
Volume of Trade 5,248 33,477 0 160,000 
 
     
GDP exporter 541 1,160 0 8,260 
GDP importer 489 1,160 0 8,260 
 
     
Gov. Expenditures exporter 9.77 188 0 98,000 
Gov. Expenditures importer 8.51 177 0 98,000 
 
     
 
     
Aggregate Trade variables    
      
Year 
 1992 5 1984 2000 
Trade  
 7,420 25,400 0 425,000 
Government  422 126 0 151,000 
GDP 
 225 751 0 9,850 
Dependency 41 7 10 55 
Urbanization 53 24 5 100 
 
     
Dummy variables     
 
     
High tariff 
 0.21    
Low tariff 
 0.38    
Soviet 
 0.05    
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.26    
East Asia 
 0.14    
Latin America 0.18    
OECD  
 0.19    
 
     
Notes: Number of bilateral observations=53,502 and number of aggregate trade observations=2,419. Data 
on tariffs have 1,791 observations. Trade is in millions of US dollars, GDP is in billions of US dollars, 
Government Expenditures in millions. Dependency and Urbanization are measured as a ratio of total 
population. 
 
There are high standard deviations in trade, both in the bilateral trade dataset and the 
aggregate trade dataset. There is a high variation from the mean of trade from countries 
which we observe in both datasets. On average, country urbanization rate is equal to 53 
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percent and ranges from 5 percent to 100 percent. The mean of the dependency ratio is 41 
percent but it ranges from 10 to 55, which means that 55 percent of the population is not 
of working age. We also see that approximately 21 percent of the countries have high 
tariff rates and 38 percent of the countries in our sample have low tariff rates. OECD 
countries constitute 19 percent of the sample and only 5 percent of the countries are 
former Soviet. Sub-Saharan and East Asian countries account for almost 40 percent of the 
sample. 
 
Analysis 
Our first effort is to examine the general trends in the level of government and the level 
of trade relative to GDP across time for the countries in our sample. The average over 
countries is shown in Figure 2.2 over the period 1962-2000.  
Figure 2.2 Yearly averages of trade share and government share during 1962-2000. 
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Table 2.2 shows the average of the trade and government as share of GDP over time 
and countries. The average for Government share is 21 percent with the standard 
deviation of 0.02 and minimum and maximum 18 percent to 23 percent, so that 
Government share is fairly tightly bound. On the other hand trade varies rather markedly 
with the mean of 30 percent and varies between 6 percent and 58. We can also see from 
the graph that trade in our data has been growing substantively. 
 
Table 2.2 Averages of Trade share and Government share over 1962-2000 
           
Variable 
  
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Trade  
 
0.30 0.16 0.06 0.58 
Government  
 
0.21 0.02 0.18 0.23 
 
     
Notes: Number of observations=6,516. Trade is as share of GDP, Government Expenditures as share of GDP. 
 
From the graph it is hard to see the relationship between the two variables. However 
it does not seem that the trends in growth of government and growth of trade coincide for 
the same period of time.  
 
Rodrik Replication 
Our first step is to replicate Rodrik’s specification as closely as possible with the 
dataset that we have at our disposal. Rodrik’s benchmark regression includes as 
dependent variable the log of the share of government expenditures in GDP average for 
 64 
years 1990-92. His independent variables include: log of per capita GDP7, log of 
urbanization in year 1990, log of dependency ratio8 in year 1990, log of openness 
(calculated as exports plus imports divided by GDP, also called as a trade share) averaged 
over years 1980-1989, and a set of dummy variables, such as socialist countries, OECD, 
Latin America, East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Table 2.3 presents results of the Rodrik’s specification of the model for the 
relationship between trade and government with some small modifications. We use the 
data for years 1984-2000 which extends the period of observation beyond that examined 
by Rodrik.  
Also Rodrik included socialist dummy and found that the coefficient on it was 
insignificant. We instead include soviet dummy, i.e. former Soviet Union and countries 
which were formed after USSR collapsed, since our data range covers period when those 
countries became independent and entered the world markets as separate entities.  
As a dependent variable we consider the log of the share of government expenditures 
average for years 1993-2000, and as independent variable we include log of openness 
(exports plus imports divided by income) averaged over years 1984-1992, log of GDP in 
1993, log of dependency in year 1993 and log of urbanization in year 1993 as well as all 
the dummies included in Rodrik’s original regression. Regression 1 is the direct 
replication of Rodrik’s results (but for the different time period and including soviet 
dummy instead of socialist).  
                                                 
7
 It is not clear which year if log of GDP Rodrik uses in his benchmark regression. I assume it is 1990, 
same year that he uses for dependency and urbanization. 
8
 Rodrik is not clear in his definition of the dependency ratio in population. I calculate the dependency ratio 
as the ratio of population which is aged <15 and over 64 divided by total population. 
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Rodrik’s benchmark regression had negative insignificant coefficients on all dummies 
except dummy on socialist which was positive. Our replication of the model shows the 
same signs of the coefficients but more of them are significant. For instance, coefficient 
for East Asia and for Sub Saharan Africa which are statistically significant at 5 percent 
level, and are equal to -0.24 and -0.48 accordingly. Also the coefficient on Soviet is 
positive and highly significant at 5 percent level equal to 0.58.  
Rodrik reports coefficient on openness that is significant and positive with the 
coefficient value of 0.223. However, our replication shows that coefficient on openness is 
equal to 0.07 and is not significant. Also we find that though coefficients on GDP, 
dependency, and urbanization have the same sign in our replication as in Rodrik’s the 
results are the opposite in significance: Rodrik reports insignificant coefficient on the first 
and significant on the others, while we find the significant coefficient on GDP and 
insignificant on dependency and urbanization. 
Regression 2 uses modified version of Rodrik’s model and includes all the 
independent variables except openness calculated as averages over period 1993-2000. We 
find in this case that coefficient on openness significant at 5 percent level but the value of 
it does not change compared to regression 1. All other coefficients in Regression 2 are 
almost identical to the coefficients in regression 1 both in statistical significance and in 
magnitude. 
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Table 2.3 Rodrik's specification 
  Dependent variable 
  Rodrik  Alternative 
  Log of Gov't share avrage1993-2000 Log of Trade share average 1993-2000 
Model  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
          
Log of GDP per capita   -0.19 -0.16*  0.30* 0.46 
   (-3.15)  (-1.65)  (1.60) (3.66) 
Log of GDP per capita_93 -0.18    0.26*    
  
(-3.25)    (1.35)    
Log dependency    -0.10* -0.04*  -0.05* 0.23* 
   (-0.31) (-0.08)  (-0.08) (0.31) 
Log dependency_93  0.02*    0.08*    
  
(0.08)    (0.13)    
Log urbanization    -0.08* -0.11*  0.78 0.58 
   (-0.89 )  (-0.93)  (3.04) (3.50) 
Log urbanization_93  -0.08*    0.80    
  
(-0.96)    (2.98)    
Soviet  0.58 0.57 0.63 -0.81 -0.80 -0.66 
  
(4.67) (4.89) (3.47) (-2.20) (-2.60) (-1.95) 
OECD  -0.04* -0.06*  0.02* 0.29* 0.25* -0.00* 
  
 (-0.48)  ( -0.61) (0.18) (1.54) (1.38) ( -0.01) 
Latin America   -0.12* -0.13* -0.10* 0.08* 0.11* 0.01* 
  
 (-1.39)  ( -1.51) (-0.86) (0.36) (0.50) (0.04) 
East Asia   -0.24 -0.25 -0.21 0.51 0.60 0.53 
  
(-2.55) ( -2.55)  (-2.01) (2.65) (2.96) (1.95) 
Sub-Sahara  -0.48 -0.46 -0.42 0.66 0.74 0.58 
  
 (-3.62) (-3.47)  (-2.74) (3.24) (3.78) (2.63) 
Log Trade share average 1984-92 0.07* 0.08 0.08*     
  
(1.57) (1.95) (1.44)     
  
        
Log Gov't share average 1984-92     0.20* 0.27 0.22* 
  
    (1.36) (1.91) (1.28) 
High tariff dummy     -0.09*    0.10* 
  
  (-0.72)   (0.55) 
Low  tariff dummy   -0.11*    0.22* 
  
  (-1.13)   (1.16) 
          
R-squared   0.24 0.23 0.22 0.44 0.44 0.56 
# of observations   142 144 107 143 146 108 
Notes:  t-statistics in parentheses. All coefficients, except * are significant at 5% level. All regressions have 
robust standard errors. Regression (1) and (4) are for year 1993 only.  All regressions except (1) and (4) have 
all independent variables as the averages of the corresponding variables over years 1993-2000.  
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Since we are interested in the question of the causality between openness and 
government expenditures we perform regression 4 which is in the sprit of Rodrik but is 
simply the reverse causality regressions in which dependent variable now becomes log of 
openness averaged over years 1993-2000. Log of the share of government expenditures 
average for years 1984-92 is now included as an independent variable along with all other 
variables. 
We find that the coefficient on government expenditures is positive equal to 0.20 but 
is not statistically significant.  We also find that GDP per capita has positive but 
insignificant coefficient, which is reverse of the finding in Rodrik’s specification, since it 
was negative and significant in regression 1. Also we report that coefficient on 
urbanization is positive and significant equal to 0.80, which is again reverse to the 
Rodrik’s specification where it was insignificant and negative. As for the dummy 
variables all of them have an opposite signs but have not changed their statistical 
significance compared to regression 1.  
In regressions 5 we use identical specification as in regressions 4 but we are using the 
averages for all of the independent variables calculated as averages over years 1993-
2000. The coefficient on government expenditures becomes statistically significant at 
10% level now and is equal to 0.27, values of all other coefficients and their statistical 
significance in this regression are have not changed compared to regression 4. Thus 
regression 5 is superior to regression 4, since the coefficients are more significant while 
their magnitudes do not change. In the reverse causality there is significance from 
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government share in period 1984-92 in trade over period 1993-2000. So our question of 
the reverse causality deserves farther investigation.  
We extend the analysis to see if the level tariffs have a predictive effect either on 
government spending or trade. Two specifications are re-estimated including dummy 
variables for high and low tariff countries; tariff levels in the middle range are the 
omitted class. The results are present in regressions 3 and 6. The coefficient estimates on 
the tariff dummies are not statistically significant. However, the point estimate for the 
alternative specifications shows that low tariff countries have a higher level of trade, 
which is seems reasonable. Also inclusion of the tariff dummies causes the significance 
level of the effect of government spending on trade to fall.   
 
Gravity Equation  
Our next specification exploits the disaggregated, bilateral trade patterns using the 
gravity model. As discussed in the theory section we will explore the gravity model in the 
time series fashion by looking at leads and lags of the 1st differences of the logs of the 
variables. First we explore the Rodrik’s hypothesis that trade causes government, in the 
gravity formulation we would look at the product of the size of the government for the 
trading countries. This regression is shown in Table 2.4 and 2.5. Table 2.4 contains the 
coefficients of interest while Table 2.5 reports coefficient on income variables. 
We find evidence of correlation between trade and government spending within the 
narrow time frame within three years is not strong the only statistically significant 
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coefficient is the percentage change in trade three periods in the future effecting 
government spending today.  
Note that the coefficients on income are less then one, which we expected because 
government spending as the component of income. They are significant between the 
current government spending and income. 
Turning to the reverse causality hypothesis we regress the percentage change in the 
bilateral trade on leads and lags of government spending. In this specification we can 
separate government spending into the data for the importer and for the exporter. 
While these results are not overwhelming two things stand out. One is that future 
values of government spending are not correlated with the current level of trade. Second, 
there is some correlation between the current level of trade and past levels of government 
spending for importers. The effect for exporters nets out over three lags.  
Since these results suggest that there may be some causal relationship from 
government spending to trade we explore the relation between trade tax revenues and 
government spending. 
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Table 2. 4. Bilateral Trade and Gravity Equation  (coefficients of interest) 
  Dependent variable 
  % ∆ in Government % ∆ in Trade 
Model   (1) (2) 
      
% ∆ in Trade at time t+3 
 
0.001   
 
 (1.65)   
% ∆ in Trade at time t+2  0.000*   
 
 (0.37)   
% ∆ in Trade at time t+1  -0.000*   
 
 (-0.09)   
% ∆ in Trade at time t   0.001*   
   
(0.70)   
% ∆ in Trade at time t-1  0.001*   
 
 (1.46)   
% ∆ in Trade at time t-2  0.000*   
 
 (0.38)   
% ∆ in Trade at time t-3 
 
0.001*   
 
 
(0.27)   
% ∆ in Importer's Gov't at time t+3   -0.024* 
 
   (-0.67) 
% ∆ in Importer's Gov't at time t+2   0.009* 
 
   (0.25) 
% ∆ in Importer's Gov't at time t+1   0.025* 
 
   (0.69) 
% ∆ in Importer's Gov't at time t   0.078 
   
  (1.86) 
% ∆ in Importer's Gov't at time t-1   0.132 
 
   (3.20) 
% ∆ in Importer's Gov't at time t-2   -0.128* 
 
   (-0.30) 
% ∆ in Importer's Gov't at time t-3   -0.045* 
 
 
  (-1.08) 
% ∆ in Exporter's Gov't at time t+3   -0.007* 
 
    (-0.16) 
% ∆ in Exporter's Gov't at time t+2   -0.001* 
 
   (-0.03) 
% ∆ in Exporter's Gov't at time t+1   0.047* 
 
   (1.04) 
% ∆ in Exporter's Gov't at time t   -0.072* 
   
  (-1.36) 
% ∆ in Exporter's  Gov't at time t-1   -0.173 
 
   (-2.86) 
% ∆ in Exporter's Gov't at time t-2   0.088* 
 
   (1.57) 
% ∆ in Exporter's Gov't at time t-3   0.092 
  
  (1.79) 
R-squared  0.195 0.019 
# of observations   53,502 53,502 
Notes:  t-statistics in parentheses. All coefficients, except * are significant at 10% level. All regressions have 
robust standard errors. Both regressions included the percentage change of income for exporter and importer, 
which are reported in Table 2.5. 
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Table 2.5 Bilateral Trade and Gravity Equation (income coefficients) 
  Dependent variable 
  % ∆ in Government % ∆ in Trade 
Model   (1) (2) 
      
% ∆ in Importer's income at time t+3 0.134* 0.057* 
 
 (1.08) (0.83) 
% ∆ in Importer's income at time t+2 -0.001* -0.131 
 
 (-0.22) (-2.14) 
% ∆ in Importer's income at time t+1 0.019 -0.004* 
 
  (5.96)  (-0.06) 
% ∆ in Importer's income at time t 0.490 1.190 
   
(29.70) (14.30) 
% ∆ in Importer's income at time t-1 0.123 -0.193 
 
  ( 4.55)  (-2.99) 
% ∆ in Importer's income at time t-2 0.045* -0.138 
 
  (0.65)  (-2.15) 
% ∆ in Importer's income at time t-3 0.130 -0.077* 
 
 
(13.39) (-1.15) 
  
    
% ∆ in Exporter's income at time t+3 0.056 0.050* 
 
 (4.40) (0.65) 
% ∆ in Exporter's income at time t+2 -0.009 -0.026* 
 
  (-1.78)  (-0.35) 
% ∆ in Exporter's income at time t+1 0.034 0.140 
 
 (3.28) (1.65) 
% ∆ in Exporter's income at time t 0.484 1.12 
   
 (25.65)  (9.93) 
% ∆ in Exporter's income at time t-1 0.113* 0.240 
 
 (1.20) (2.18) 
% ∆ in Exporter's income at time t-2 0.061* -0.224 
 
 (0.47) (-2.26) 
% ∆ in Exporter's income at time t-3 0.141 -0.055* 
  
(13.88) (-0.66) 
Constant   -0.004 0.022 
    (-4.01) (2.84) 
R-squared  0.195 0.019 
# of observations   53,502 53,502 
Notes:  t-statistics in parentheses. All coefficients, except * are significant at 10% level. All regressions 
have robust standard errors. This table reports income coefficients and coefficients on constant from 
regression in Table 2.4. 
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Tax Revenues and Government 
Next we investigate the relationship between total tax revenues from trade and 
government expenditures.  The graph of the relationship is depicted in Figure 2.3. 
Visually, there appears to be a positive relation between trade tax revenues and the size of 
government. Even so, this relation is almost surely strongly affected by 
heteroskedasticity. 
Figure 2.3 Relationship between government and tax revenues. 
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We undertook a time series analysis of government expenditures and trade tax 
revenues for short lags. We regressed the percentage change in each on leads and lags of 
the other for up to three periods. We also estimated these regressions separately for high, 
medium, and low tariff countries. There was no causal inference to be drawn. The only 
significant effect was that the current percentage change in government spending is 
negatively correlated with the current percent change in trade tax revenues.  
We next perform an analysis of the long term relationship for causality between 
government and revenues from trade. In order to do that we calculate the logs of average 
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of government expenditures as a percent of income over years 1993-2000 and the logs of 
averages of the tax revenues from trade as a percent of income over years 1984-1992. We 
then regress the average of government on the average of trade. The result is reported in 
Table 2.6. 
 
Table 2.6 Tax Revenue from Trade and Government in the Long Run 
         
  
Government share  
1993-2000 
Trade Revenue share  
1993-2000 
Variable 
  
(1) (2) 
    
Trade Revenue share 1984-92 0.007*    
 
 
(0.34)    
Government share 1984-92   3.421 
 
 
  (2.35) 
Constant 
 
-1.630 -0.503* 
  (-30.00) (-1.30) 
       
R-squared   0.002 0.029 
# of observations 90 90 
Notes: Revenue from Trade share and Government Expenditures shares are calculated as average over 
the corresponding period of time. t-statistics in parentheses. All coefficients, except * are significant at 
5% level. All regressions have robust standard errors.  
 
Regression 1 investigates if trade revenues in 1984-1992 had any significant 
influence on government share between 1993 and 2000. We find the coefficient is 
positive but not significant. The second regression in the table checks for the reverse 
causality in this relationship. We witness that government expenditures from 1984-1992 
are a good predictor of tax revenues from trades for the time between 1993 and 2000. We 
see the coefficient on government expenditures is statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level and is equal to 3.42. 
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Based on all the results reported in Table 2.6 we can conclude that while the short 
term relation between government expenditures and tax revenues from trade does not 
seem to be strong there is some evidence of the longer term relation between the two. 
Based on our results it seems that the causality is running from government to trade but 
not the other way around.  
 
Volatility 
In the last part of our analysis we undertake a more detailed investigation of Rodrik’s 
idea that government acts as a social insurance in the world of uncertainty in trade. To do 
this we exploit the disaggregation of the bilateral trade data. We create a measure for the 
volatility of trade from the pair-wise combinations of trading partners. For import 
volatility we calculate the average of the sum of the squares of the difference in the level 
of imports for country i and each of its trading partners from one year to the next. The 
same calculation is performed for exports. Then import and export volatilities are added 
together. Our idea is that even if the overall level of trade doesn’t change from year to 
year, variation in trading partners is a measure of disruption.  
The Rodrik argument is that trade volatility should cause income volatility, so we 
regress fluctuations in income year to year on our measure of trade volatility. Current and 
lag values are included. Then we regress the change in government expenditures on these 
measures of trade and income volatility. Some summary statistics are shown in Table 2.7 
and the regressions in Table 2.8. 
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Table 2.7 Volatility of Trade and Income 
            
Variable 
  
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
   
 
  
Trade Volatility 
 
1.51 1.33 0.02 40.11 
 
 
    
Income Volatility 
 
0.01 0.04 0.00 1.08 
 
     
Notes: Number of observations=2,767 for Trade Volatility and 2,402 for Income Volatility. 
 
The volatility of income is measured as a square of the percentage change in income. 
We can see from Table 2.7 Trade volatility has the mean equal to 1.51, with a minimum 
of 0.02 and maximum of 40.11. At the same time the standard deviation is only 1.33. As 
for the income volatility the mean here is equal to 0.01 but the standard deviation is four 
times higher than the mean and is equal to 0.04. Income volatility ranges between the 
values of 0.00 and 1.08. 
Regression 1 in Table 2.8 shows that volatility in trade has a direct negative influence 
on changes in income. Regression 2 performs a test on the relationship between volatility 
of trade and volatility of income. We find the two are positively correlated, with the 
coefficient on the volatility of trade significant at the 5 percent level and equal to 1.98. 
Finally, Regression 3 looks at changes in GDP, volatility of trade and volatility of 
income, as well as their lags, as explanatory variables for changes in government 
expenditures. We consider three variables, and their time shifts, that may affect 
government expenditure levels: the volatility of trade, the volatility of income and the 
percentage change in GDP. We find that volatility of trade is statistically significant at 
the 5 percent level while the volatility of income is not significant. 
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Table 2.8 Volatility 
  Dependent variable 
  % ∆ in GDP Volatility of Income % ∆ in Government 
Model  (1) (2) (3) 
         
Volatility of Trade  -2.24 1.98 0.84 
  
(-5.30) (3.95) (2.43) 
Volatility of Trade at time t-1  0.86 -0.09* -0.94 
  
(2.98)  (-0.53) (-2.26) 
Volatility of Trade at time t-2  0.80 0.11* 0.60 
  
(3.47) (0.70) (1.88) 
  
     
% ∆ in GDP     85.48 
     (12.44) 
% ∆ in GDP at time t-1    2.37* 
  
   (0.46) 
Volatility of Income     -21.23* 
   
  
(-1.40 ) 
Volatility of Income at time t-1     -19.05* 
  
   (-1.45) 
Constant  3.82 -2.09 -0.92* 
  
 (5.88) (-4.25) (-1.33) 
          
R-squared  0.09 0.31 0.29 
# of observations   2,093 2,093 2,086 
Notes:  t-statistics in parentheses. All coefficients, except * are significant at 10% level. All regressions 
have robust standard errors. GDP and government variables are in logs. All the coefficients are scaled by 
100. 
 
Entry into GATT 
Analysis presented in Table 2.9 accounts for some other factors not included in the 
models we present in our analyses. Our approach in Table 2.9 is to approximate the 
“openness” of a country by observing the change in trade in the years after a country 
joins GATT. We consider different intervals of time before and after the entry into this 
trade agreement. We regress the average yearly growth rates after a country joins the 
GATT on the average yearly growth rates before joining. 
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In the analysis, we consider models for the growth of total trade, trade as a share of 
GDP, government expenditures and government expenditures as a share of GDP. We find 
highly statistically significant negative coefficients for all the specifications for 1 and 3-
year time period spanning before and after entering into GATT. However at the 8 and 10-
year time period spanning all of the specifications considered exhibit positive, highly 
statistically significant coefficients. In other words, in the short run after entering GATT 
we witness the negative effect on growth of trade and government expenditures and in the 
long run the effect becomes positive. Trade and government expenditures are growing 
together in the long run window after entering GATT. 
The last two regressions in Table 2.9 explore growth of trade share, N years after a 
country entered GATT, on the growth of government share before a country’s entrance 
into GATT and the reverse of this relationship. We find that up to N = 8 years, the growth 
of government before entrance has a highly significant negative effect on growth of trade 
after the entrance. At the same time, we see the reverse tendency when growth of trade 
before joining GATT had a positive effect on post-GATT entrance growth of government 
(with the exception of N = 3 years). 
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Table 2.9 Regressions of growth of GATT countries  
    N=1 N=3 N=5 N=8 N=10 
Models   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
Trade Total  -0.233 -0.175 0.018 0.088 0.163 
  (-11.28) (-18.54) (1.26) ( 4.87 ) (16.49) 
       
Trade/GDP  -0.137 -0.142 0.005 0.075 0.136 
  (-10.15) (-26.82) (0.32)  (4.13 ) (15.33) 
       
Gov expenditures total -0.183 -0.026 0.175 0.195 0.166 
  (-9.71) (-1.76) (9.29) (21.69) (20.28) 
       
Gov expenditures/GDP -0.110 -0.057 0.037 0.152 0.151 
  (-5.53) (-3.16) (1.61) (16.38) (14.73) 
       
Growth of Government/GDP 
before GATT* -0.495 -0.679 -0.321 -0.198 0.221 
  (-12.02) (-28.16) (-10.33)  (-4.34) ( 7.08) 
       
Growth of Trade before GATT** 0.011 -0.047 0.008 0.053 0.060 
  (1.86)  (-7.77) (1.44) (50.79) (50.24) 
       
Notes: Dependent variables:  growths of corresponding variables after entering GATT; independent 
variables are growths of corresponding variables before entering GATT. t-statistics in parentheses. N is 
number of years before/after entering GATT.  
* regressions have a growth of trade share after GATT as dependent variable and 1,762 observations.  
** regressions have a growth of gov't share after GATT as dependent variables and 1,752 observations. 
 
 
Conclusion 
We performed and investigation of the causal relationship between trade and 
government expenditures, in the attempt to extend the work of Rodrik (1996). Several 
different tests were conducted. The first is the simple replication of Rodrik’s benchmark 
model on the extended dataset. The results here are not conclusive but suggest that the 
causation may run from government spending to trade.  
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Next we use bilateral trade in observations and the augmented form of the classic 
gravity equation used by trade economists. This analysis uses time series changes in 
government spending and in trade. Test for Granger style causality are performed. Again 
little evidence is found for Rodrik’s hypothesis that trade causes government spending. 
And some weak evidence exists for the alternative hypothesis. 
Next we extend the analysis to Trade tax revenues under searching for the possible 
link between government spending and revenues gained from tariffs.  
Little evidence is found over short run periods but over the long run there does seem 
to be an association between the high Trade tax revenues in one period and high 
government expenditures in the next period. 
Finally we look at a more direct test of the Rodrik’s hypothesis. Rodrik’s story is that 
trade creates volatility in income which then induces government to provide social 
insurance in the form of government expenditures. We calculate a measure of trade 
volatility by looking at bilateral trading partners. And find that trade volatility is 
associated with income volatility. Then the relationship between income volatility and the 
government expenditures is exploit the results of this test are ambiguous because changes 
in government expenditures are negative related to income volatility but at the same time 
positively related to trade volatility. 
Thus at this point the results of the inquiry are not conclusive but certainly suggestive 
that the Rodrik’s hypothesis requires further investigation. 
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